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Summary
From caregiver and infant playing with a toy, to singing duets or playing bas-
ketball, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others to-
wards a common focus. Joint attention plays a fundamental role in our social
lives. It ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language,
understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. According
to some researchers, the capacity for joint attention is one of the features that
distinguishes humans from other animals.
It is generally agreed that joint attention is "out in the open" among
co-attenders: they are mutually aware of sharing attention to the same object
or event. This mutual awareness puts the "jointness" in joint attention,
and distinguishes it from cases of accidental, uncoordinated attention to
the same object. How the notion of openness in joint attention should be
analysed, however, is still hotly debated. Going beyond the metaphor of
openness requires an examination of the mutual awareness that underlies
joint attention. Additionally, current research is exclusively focused on vision.
Yet we constantly coordinate attention in multisensory rich environments.
Musicians jointly attend to the music they make together, we can effortlessly
attend jointly to the aroma of wild spring flower, and the touch of others can
help us in recognising where their attention is directed. Moreover, a narrow
focus on visual joint attention may result in misleading and even prejudicial
assessments of the intersubjective capacities of persons with sensory deficits
(e.g., deaf, blind, and deaf-blind). A more systematic representation of how
non-visual sensory resources contribute to joint attention is needed.
In this doctoral thesis, I combine philosophical and empirical methods
to examine the role of perceptual experience in joint attention, including in
cases involving multiple sense modalities. This aim is pursued in two related
sub-objectives. First, I clarify the role of mutual awareness and perceptual
experience in characterising joint attention. Second, I propose a functional
framework to assess multisensory contributions to establishing and maintain-
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ing joint attention and, in turn, how joint attention may affect multisensory
perception.
The thesis is a collection of four individual research articles addressing
these topics. In the first article, I critically examine the proposal that joint at-
tention is based on some primitive intersubjective experiential relation, which
cannot be analysed in terms of the mental states of each individual. I ad-
vance several arguments against this view and conclude that the theory is not
conceptually sound. Following this work, in the second article I propose an
empirically-informed account of the openness in joint attention. I suggest
that mutual awareness is not something co-attenders must arrive at, but that
it is often implicitly assumed. The third article proposes that joint attention
is fundamentally a multisensory phenomenon, and shows in detail how non-
visual senses make essential contributions to joint attention. Building on this
proposal, the fourth article presents an empirical study testing whether enga-
ging in joint attention with another person can impact one’s own multisensory
perceptual processing. I conclude the thesis with a general discussion of the
implications of this work for philosophy, social neuroscience, and multisens-
ory research.
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In the spring of 1887, seven-year-old Helen Keller was holding her hand under
the running water from a well spout. Keller had lost her sight and hearing at
nineteen months old, growing into a withdrawn child and struggling to make
herself understood. She lived, as she later put it, “at sea in a dense fog” — until
that day in 1887, when her teacher Anne Mansfield Sullivan, herself visually
impaired, taught her her first word:
As the cool stream gushed over one hand [Miss Sullivan] spelled
into the other the word water, first slowly, then rapidly. I stood
still, my whole attention fixed upon the motions of her fingers.
Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something forgotten—a
thrill of returning thought; and somehow the mystery of language
was revealed to me. I knew then that “w-a-t-e-r” meant the
wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. (Keller,
1903, 23)
Using their sense of touch, Sullivan made the water present to Keller through
their shared attention to it, and could then name it through her movements.
In what Keller later called her “soul’s sudden awakening”, this episode became
her entry into the social world of communication and language.
Human beings are able to effortlessly engage with each other in activit-
ies that require attending to an object or event together. Engagement in joint
attention provides a context for the child to associate language with its refer-
ent, contributing to vocabulary acquisition and language learning (Tomasello
& Farrar, 1986; Bruner, 1998; Adamson et al., 2019). More generally, joint at-
tention plays a key role in the development of mentalising, the ability to infer
and understand other people’s mental states, as well as more sophisticated
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forms of social cognition and action coordination (Moore & Dunham, 1995;
Carpenter et al., 1998; Eilan et al., 2005; Seemann, 2011b). According to Mi-
chael Tomasello (2008), the capacity for joint attention is one of the features
that distinguishes humans from other animals.
It is generally agreed that joint attention is “out in the open” among co-
attenders, where they are mutually aware of sharing attention to the same ob-
ject or event. In this respect, joint attention differs from cases of accidental,
uncoordinated attending to the same object. This mutual awareness puts the
“jointness” in joint attention. As Jerome Bruner (1995) puts it, joint attention
involves a “meeting of minds”. How the notion of mutual awareness should be
analysed, however, is still intensely debated. Additionally, current research is
exclusively focused on vision. Yet we constantly coordinate attention in multi-
sensory rich environments. Moreover, such narrow focus on visual joint atten-
tion misrepresents the intersubjective capacities of persons with sensory de-
ficits (e.g., deaf, blind, and deaf-blind). Helen Keller’s experience of language
learning belies the importance of providing a principled way to explain the
role of non-visual modalities in joint attention.
In this doctoral thesis, I combine philosophical and empirical methods to
examine the role of perceptual experience in joint attention, including in cases
involving multiple sensory modalities. This aim is pursued in two related sub-
objectives. First, I clarify the role of mutual awareness and perceptual exper-
ience in characterising joint attention. Second, I propose a functional frame-
work to assess multisensory contributions to establishing and maintaining
joint attention and, in turn, how joint attention may affect multisensory per-
ception.
The thesis is a collection of four individual research papers addressing
these topics. In the first paper, I critically examine the proposal that joint
attention is based on some primitive intersubjective experiential relation,
which cannot be analysed in terms of the mental states of each individual
(Paper I). In a paper closely following this work, I propose an empirically
informed account of the openness in joint attention (Paper II). I suggest that
mutual awareness is not something co-attenders must arrive at, but that it
is often implicitly assumed. The third paper proposes that joint attention
is fundamentally a multisensory phenomenon, and shows in detail how
non-visual senses make essential contributions to joint attention (Paper
III). Building on this proposal, the fourth paper presents an empirical study
testing whether engaging in joint attention with another person can impact
one’s own multisensory processing of temporal stimuli (Paper IV). I conclude
the thesis with a general discussion of the implications of this work. I outline
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directions for future research in the areas of joint attention, socially shared
perception, and their intersection with multisensory research.
1 The jointness of joint attention
The term joint attention was introduced in research on the ontogeny of com-
munication by Jerome Bruner and colleagues (Bruner, 1974; Scaife & Bruner,
1975) to refer to infants’ developing capacity to share their experiences about
objects and events with others. Between the age of nine and eighteen months,
most of us change from being able to guide someone’s attention, through ges-
tures or voice, to being able to reciprocally coordinate our attention with oth-
ers on a third object of interest (Carpenter et al., 1998). In our everyday life,
we continue to rely on this skill to communicate, share experiences, and co-
ordinate with others. During joint attention, both co-attenders are mutually
aware of each other’s attention toward the same object or event. It is imme-
diately “open” to co-attenders that they are jointly attending to the same ob-
ject or event. This mutual awareness differentiates joint attention from cases
where two people happen to look at the same object, unaware of the other’s
attention. But the notion of mutual awareness has been notoriously difficult
to conceptualise. As Hannes Rakoczy writes:
What makes such an episode one of truly joint attention? It is not
sufficient that each of [the co-attenders] looks at the same target,
nor that, asymmetrically, one sees the other looking somewhere
and follows her gaze to the same target. [. . . ] Rather, in some in-
tuitive sense that conceptually proves notoriously difficult to spell
out, both have to attend to the same target in joint and coordinated
ways. (Rakoczy, 2018, 409)
Axel Seemann (2011a) proposes a useful distinction between reductive and
non-reductive theories that attempt to explain the jointness in joint attention.
Reductive theories explain what is to be jointly engaged towards a mutually
shared object of attention by addressing the mental states of each participant
separately and explaining how they come together. The reductive approach is
thus “individualistic”, in the sense that the collective mental activity at play in
joint attention can be reductively explained in terms of coordinated individual
mental activities.
One reasonable reductive approach is to treat the notion of jointness in
joint attention as a special case of common knowledge or common belief and
analyse it accordingly. Following Lewis (1969) and Schiffer (1972), common
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knowledge is traditionally analysed with recursive propositions, so that two
people have common knowledge that p only when they all know that p, and
they all know that they all know that p, and they all know that they all know
that they all know that p, and so on, ad infinitum. In a similar way, two people
jointly attend to an object x, when they both attend to x, and they are aware
that they attend to x, and they are aware that they are aware that they attend
to x, and so on. Peacocke’s (2005) account comes very close to this character-
isation. According to this account, co-attenders must be aware that a whole
complex state of awareness exists between them. Joint attention is possible
only for beings who have some way of representing one’s own and others’ at-
tention and mental states, and the ability to entertain reflexive states, such
as having thoughts about thoughts (Peacocke, 2005). A common criticism
against this iterative approach, however, is that it requires a psychologically
implausible chain of recursive mental states, especially as infants are usually
assumed to start participating in joint attention before their eighteenth month
of age (Eilan, 2005; Campbell, 2018; Seemann, 2019). It also does not feel like
we have to go through multiple inferences in order to arrive at joint attention.
When you are involved in a situation of joint attention, you grasp this imme-
diately or instantaneously. It is unclear how reductive accounts based on an
iteration of mental states can explain this immediacy (Calabi, 2008).
Motivated from the failure of iterative approaches, non-reductive theories
address the challenge of the openness in joint attention by taking it as a
primitive condition. Non-reductive, anti-individualistic views in this sense
notably include Campbell’s relational account (Campbell, 2005, 2011, 2018),
and Axel Seemann’s (2011c; 2019) account, which closely follows Campbell’s.
Other non-reductive accounts include Naomi Eilan’s proposal that joint
attention is grounded in primitive conscious states of “you-awareness” and
“communication-as-connection” (2015), and Michael Schmitz’s account of
an elementary form of collective subjecthood (Schmitz, 2015). Since John
Campbell’s relational view is the one that most closely engages with percep-
tual experience, on this thesis I will carefully assess its merits (Paper I). Other
non-reductive views will be treated in comparatively less detail.
Campbell’s view is based on his anti-representational, relational theory of
perception. According to the relational theory, perceptual experiences are, in
part, directly constituted by the actual perceived objects in the world. Per-
ceptual experience is a matter of there being a causal and immediate relation
between a subject and a token object in the outside world, and not a rela-
tion between subject and some abstract mental representation (see, among
others, Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2004; Travis, 2004). In the case of joint atten-
tion, the fact that the other person is also jointly attending to the object is said
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to be a constituent part of my experience (Campbell, 2005, 2011). This per-
ceptual experience cannot be further reduced to the individual states of each
co-attender, or to mental representations (Campbell, 2018). However, there
are several problems with theories that take mutual awareness as a primitive
phenomenon. Peacocke argues that taking joint attention as a primitive phe-
nomenon seems to simply embed into the notion of a constitutive co-attender
the property which is to be explained: the openness of joint attention (Pea-
cocke, 2005). The first paper in this thesis examines in detail the primitivist
view on its own grounds, and advances several arguments against it. A further
motivation against a primitivist non-representational view of joint attention
is that it goes against much of mainstream cognitive psychology and neuros-
cience. Conceptualising perceptual states in terms of representations is a use-
ful assumption in much empirical research on vision and attention (Burge,
2005). A non-representational view of joint attention does not have the re-
sources to fully address the relation between individual attention and percep-
tion, as it is currently studied in the cognitive neurosciences, and the phe-
nomenon of joint attention. A different approach more in line with current
empirical evidence is needed.
2 Perceptual experience and the epistemic signific-
ance of joint attention
In addressing the jointness question, most philosophers have focused on the
epistemic role of joint attention. The general assumption is that joint attention
provides the epistemic basis for joint actions, communication, and for sharing
knowledge about the world around us (Campbell, 2002, 2011; Peacocke, 2005;
Eilan, 2005). Thus, for example, Eilan explicitly calls the question of explicat-
ing the kind of mutual awareness we find in joint attention, as a preemptive
“epistemological question” (Eilan, 2005, 4). Seemann argues that joint atten-
tion has “a special kind of epistemic power”: it provides co-attenders “with
the kind of common knowledge about [the co-attended] objects that makes
demonstrative communication possible” (Seemann, 2019, 34). John Campbell
notes that “whatever else is true of it, joint attention has an ‘openness’ about
it, [. . . ] in virtue of which joint attention ordinarily plays a distinctive role in
rational, coordinated action” (Campbell, 2011, 417).
Due to this exclusive focus on its epistemological significance, however, the
debate on how to characterise the jointness of joint attention has been mostly
disconnected from debates in the philosophy of perception and perceptual ex-
perience. From the point of view of perceptual experience, the question of the
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openness in joint attention takes a particular shape. Perceptual experiences
are enjoyed strictly by individual perceivers, each with their own perceptual
standpoint. Perception is always from somewhere: the perspective of the indi-
vidual perceiver. How can different observers, with their different standpoints
and perspectives, perceive objects together? The qualitative aspects of percep-
tual experience cannot be strictly identical between us. We need an account
that retains the individualistic nature of perceptual experience, while explain-
ing how we come to perceive objects and events together during joint atten-
tion (Seemann, 2019). The account I propose in this thesis, therefore, takes
a reductive individualist approach: the jointness in joint attention can be ac-
counted for in terms of the individual mental states of each co-attender. But
I also take insights from non-reductive accounts: the jointness of joint atten-
tion is held by each individual as a unitary representation, which need not be
constructed out of prior iterative representations (Paper II). The proposed ap-
proach, I argue, shifts the epistemic question from explaining how individuals
can attain a relation that justifies shared knowledge of the perceptual envir-
onment, to explaining how individuals abstain from defaulting to erroneous
assumptions of mutual awareness.
In virtue of its epistemic role, joint attention is arguably the foundation
for the concept of a shared objective world (Davidson, 1999; Campbell, 2011;
Seemann, 2019). Examining the notion of a shared openness between co-
attenders may thus contribute to philosophical views on the emergence of
this shared objectivity (Carey, 2009; Burge, 2010). Moreover, things being “out
in the open” or “transparent” is thought to be a distinctive mark of common
knowledge, common ground, and of successful communication (Stalnaker,
2002; Grice, 1957; Campbell, 2018). As one of the social phenomena with this
property, elucidating in what sense the state of joint attention is “out in the
open” will constitute an advancement for our understanding of more complex
social and communicative interactions.
3 Multisensory perception and joint attention
Research on joint attention within philosophical and psychological discip-
lines has been mostly focused on the visual domain. In everyday interactions,
however, many joint attention scenarios will crucially involve non-visual
means of capturing someone’s attention as well as non-visual targets of
attention, which recruit the selection and integration of information from
different senses. From singing a simple duet to playing in a symphony orches-
tra, musicians jointly attend to the music they make together; hunters can
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jointly attend to the sound of birds in the trees, and decide how to position
themselves for capture; we can effortlessly attend jointly to the aroma of wild
spring flower, and the touch of others can help us in recognising where their
attention is directed.
While most researchers would acknowledge that joint attention is often
achieved by using multimodal cues, current measures and operationalisations
of joint attention are still exclusively based on vision (Akhtar & Gernsbacher,
2008; Botero, 2016). As a consequence, there is currently no principled ac-
count of how non-visual modalities are involved in establishing and main-
taining joint attention. An overemphasis on gaze coordination alone can even
lead to biased assessments of an individual’s ability to coordinate and inter-
act with others. In one particularly extreme example, this vision-centric bias
led to the claim that blind children must be trained in eye contact and correct
facial orientation, since “the facial orientation of a blind person toward the
speaker provides at least some indication [to the speaker] of [the blind per-
son’s] listening behavior” (Foxx, 1977). Research on social robotics has sim-
ilarly been mostly focused on vision. Giving robots and avatars human-like
eyes that would respond to ours is given priority in the design of interactive
artificial agents (Admoni & Scassellati, 2017; Yang et al., 2018). But is vision
the hallmark of human social cognition? Which role do the other senses play
in joint attention?
To date, a few studies have started to examine auditory and tactile cues
accompanying episodes of joint attention, and the strategies used by blind,
deaf, and deaf-blind individuals to coordinate attention (e.g. Yu & Smith, 2013;
Núñez, 2014; Depowski et al., 2015; Suarez-Rivera et al., 2019). Yet, at present,
there is no clear framework to encompass other modalities and their inter-
action with what we know about vision in the study of joint attention. As
part of this thesis, I propose that joint attention is fundamentally a multis-
ensory phenomenon, and analyse in detail how the combination of multiple
senses not only facilitates visual coordination but is even necessary for cer-
tain uses of joint attention (Paper III). A multisensory approach to joint at-
tention brings together two areas of research across experimental psychology,
cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy that are usually independent: social
cognition and multisensory research. Although vision-centred research will
certainly continue to provide valuable insight into the workings of joint atten-
tion, taking into account the several roles of non-visual senses will advance
our knowledge of how people naturally establish, maintain and tune joint at-
tention to a range of sensory objects and features.
A multisensory approach to joint attention will also allow distinguishing
possible interactions between multisensory processes and coordinated atten-
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tion. While the use of multiple sense modalities can affect how joint attention
is established and maintained, engaging in joint attention may in turn affect
an individual’s multisensory processes. The functional significance of joint at-
tention, at least when it comes to adults, has been usually characterised at the
group level: joint attention forms the basis for joint action, collective inten-
tions, and provides a rational foundation for communication and for sharing
knowledge about our environment.
But a recent body of research is emerging that shows the influence of so-
cially coordinated attention on individual perceptual and cognitive processes,
including processes which are not per se typically seen as part of social cog-
nition, such as mental rotation, memory, and perceptual sensitivity (Mundy,
2018; Becchio et al., 2008; Shteynberg, 2015). For example, experiencing joint
attention with another person facilitates the detection and discrimination of
visual objects (Frischen et al., 2007), and it enhances a participant’s mental
spatial rotation performance when judging the handedness (left or right) of
images of hands at different angles (Böckler et al., 2011). Engaging in joint
attention to a common object facilitates information encoding in working
memory for that object (Kim & Mundy, 2012; Gregory & Jackson, 2017),
and impacts the affective appraisals of objects in the environment (Bayliss
et al., 2006). Participants are also better at detecting nearly imperceptible
patterns when someone else is also looking towards the same patterns (Seow
& Fleming, 2019). These studies, however, are predominantly based on visual
perceptual targets. But does joint attention affect an individual’s multisensory
perception?
One prevalent hypothesis regarding the functional role of joint attention is
that it deepens or enhances the encoding of stimulus information in ways that
are not observed when information is individually attended (Becchio et al.,
2008; Mundy, 2016, 2018). Joint attention adds a further level of selectivity
to an individual’s attention. An open question is whether this hypothesis ex-
tends to the temporal multisensory processing of events. Although theoret-
ically motivated, this is an empirical question not amenable to philosophical
theorising. To address this question, therefore, I conducted a behavioural psy-
chophysics study measuring how engaging in joint attention with another per-
son can impact one’s own multisensory perceptual processing (Paper IV). We
used the sound-induced flash illusions, which are reliable indicators of tem-
poral multisensory integration (Shams et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2004; Keil,
2020; Hirst et al., 2020). In the fission illusion, a single flash accompanied by
two task-irrelevant auditory beeps induces a visual percept of two flashes; in
the fusion illusion, two flashes are perceived as one when accompanied by one
beep.
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Previous studies on the impact of joint attention on spatial multisensory
processing have focused on the effect of social eye gaze cues, elicited through
an artificial partner or avatar (De Jong & Dijkerman, 2019; Nuku & Bekkering,
2010). As noted above, however, joint attention involves the minimal under-
standing that one is currently sharing attention to the same object or event
with another agent. To take this interpersonal aspect into account, we tested
pairs of participants, who performed the flash-counting task either alone, or
in pairs sitting in close proximity. Following the hypothesis that engaging in
joint attention enhances the relative processing of the jointly attended visual
target, we expected a change in the relative weight accorded to visual and aud-
itory information, so that the influence of the auditory distractor, and thus of
the strength of both illusions, will be reduced.
We replicated the effect of both sound-induced flash illusions, as meas-
ured by the number of flashes reported. We did not find any statistically sig-
nificant effects for our main hypothesis. People did not perform better nor
worse across the different social conditions tested, for both fission and fu-
sion illusions. Using signal detection measures, we found that people’s cri-
terion bias was less affected by the auditory beeps for the fusion illusion (their
bias decreased), when engaged in joint attention as contrasted with the in-
dividual condition, although this reduction was not enough to effect a signi-
ficant change in the mean number of flashes reported. Our findings indicate
that the strength of both fission and fusion illusions is not sensitive to engage-
ment in joint attention. Our results highlight the limitations of the hypothesis
that joint attention enhances stimulus information encoding and processing
in multisensory settings. With this study, we provide grounds for future work
in whether and how social factors may influence multisensory processing.
4 Thesis synopsis
This thesis is concerned with the role of perceptual experience in joint atten-
tion, and aims to contribute to two questions:
• What is the jointness in joint attention, and how it should be analysed?
• How different senses shape joint attention and, conversely, how can joint
attention affect perception across modalities?
The dissertation is made of a collection of individual research papers ad-
dressing these questions. In the course of these papers, I advance, first,
an empirically-informed account of joint attention and its basis on mutual
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awareness. Second, I show that non-visual senses make essential contribu-
tions to joint attention, and develop experimental methods for testing how
joint attention can affect perception across sense modalities. Below, I include
summaries of each research paper, and information about where they have
been accepted for publication, if applicable.
Paper I: Joint attention and perceptual experiences
Joint attention refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or
more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open”
to all attenders that they are so engaged. But there is no consensus on how to
analyse this mutual “openness”. One prominent account, based on relational
or “naive” theories of perception, is to view joint attention as a primitive re-
lation of consciousness, which is not to be explained in terms of the mental
states of each individual (Campbell, 2011, 2018). In this paper, we critically
assess this approach and find it conceptually unsound. This approach to joint
attention has proved to be attractive to both philosophers and scientists con-
cerned with social cognition and its development (e.g., Moll & Meltzoff, 2011).
That this view is not conceptually feasible is therefore critical to several lines
of research in social cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. Our argu-
ments have wider implications for debates in theories of common knowledge,
demonstrative communication, and the philosophy of perception.
This paper has been published under open access (Creative Commons At-
tribution 4.0 International License) as:
Battich, L. and Geurts, B. (2020). Joint attention and perceptual experience.
Synthese, doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02602-6.
Paper II: Opening up the openness of joint attention
Joint attention is often defined as a mutually “open” relation between co-
attenders: they are mutually aware of being so engaged. But how should
this openness be characterised? In this paper, I first distinguish between two
explanatory aims often conflated in the current debate: the aim of explaining
the normative role of joint attention in justifying joint endeavours and shared
knowledge of the world, and the cognitive aim of explicating the psychological
capacities and wherewithal involved in joint attention. I argue that current
theoretical accounts of joint attention are primarily designed to tackle the
normative concerns, and their problems arise when they conflate these
concerns with psychological ones. Drawing from evidence in developmental
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and cognitive psychology, I outline the case for a cognitive account of joint
attention based on a weaker notion of openness and mutual awareness. My
arguments have direct relevance to philosophical debates on shared mental
states and, in particular, the notion of a common ground of knowledge shared
between interactants.
Paper III: Coordinating attention requires coordinated senses
Playing tennis, singing together, ordering a cake: we effortlessly coordinate
each other’s attention towards a common focus in rich multisensory ways. In
this paper, we propose that joint attention is fundamentally a multisensory
phenomenon. We highlight that joint attention relies on the strategic coordin-
ation of many senses and not just from following other people’s eye gaze or
pointing gestures, and propose a novel framework to assess the multisensory
contributions to joint attention. Our paper bridges two research areas: the
study of joint attention, which is embedded in the fields of social cognition,
developmental psychology and social robotics, and the study of multisens-
ory attention within psychology and cognitive neuroscience. The former re-
mains primarily focused on vision and can benefit from research on the role
of joint attention across sensory modalities. Multisensory research, on the
other hand, remains centred on single individuals. As most everyday objects
and events that we jointly attend to are multisensory, whether and how social
factors influence multisensory processing opens new avenues of research. We
outline clear directions for future experimental research, and detail the im-
plications for social robots, clinical diagnostics, and theoretical debates on
shared objectivity.
This paper has been published under open access (Creative Commons At-
tribution 4.0 International License) as:
Battich, L., Fairhurst, M., and Deroy, O. (2020). Coordinating attention
requires coordinated senses. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 27 (6),
1126–1138. doi: 10.3758/s13423-020-01766-z.
Paper IV: The impact of joint attention on the sound-induced
flash illusions
Among the open questions in multisensory research is whether social factors
influence multisensory processing. In this pre-registered study, we investig-
ated whether joint attention impacts temporal multisensory integration. A
leading hypothesis on the functional role of joint attention is that it enhances
12 General Introduction
the encoding and processing of the jointly attended perceptual informa-
tion (Mundy, 2018). We tested whether this hypothesis holds for temporal
multisensory processing by using the well-documented sound-induced flash
illusions, where a single flash is perceived as two when accompanied by
two auditory beeps (fission), and two flashes as one when accompanied by
one beep (fusion) (Shams et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2004). We compared
participants’ performance in a flash-counting task in three conditions: alone,
jointly attending with someone else, and a non-joint attention social con-
dition. If the processing of the jointly attended visual target is facilitated
relative to the sound distractor, then we would expect that the illusions
would be reduced. We found that people’s criterion bias in the fusion illusion
diminished when they engaged in joint attention. Importantly, however,
as measured by the number of flashes reported, people did not perform
statistically better nor worse across the different social conditions tested,
indicating that the strength of the illusions is not sensitive to engagement in
joint attention. These findings show the limitations of the hypothesis that
joint attention enhances stimulus information processing in multisensory
settings. This study provides grounds for future work in studying the effects of
joint attention on different multisensory processes.
This paper is has been accepted for future publication at Attention, Percep-
tion & Psychophysics:
Battich, L., Garzorz, I., Wahn, B., and Deroy, O. (forthcoming 2021). The im-
pact of joint attention on the sound-induced flash illusions. Attention, Per-
ception and Psychophysics.
Chapter 2
Paper I: Joint Attention and
Perceptual Experience
Battich, L. and Geurts, B. (2020). Joint attention and perceptual experience.
Synthese, doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02602-6.
Author contributions:
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Abstract
Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two
or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all
attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint
attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common
awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive
phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent
representative of the latter approach, and the main focus of this paper. We argue
that Campbell’s theory is problematic for a variety of reasons, through which runs
a common thread: most of the problems that the theory is faced with arise from the
relational view of perception that he endorses, and, more generally, they suggest that
perceptual experience is not sufficient for an analysis of joint attention.
Keywords Joint attention · Perceptual experience · Common knowledge ·
Relationalism · Perception · John Campbell
1 Introduction
Unbeknownst to each other, we are looking at the same piece of cake. Our attention is
shared, but we don’t know that it is, and therefore the fact that our attention is shared
doesn’t affect us in any way. But now we both come to realize that we are looking at
the same piece of cake. Our visual attention becomes coordinated: alternating glances
between the cake and the other, each is now aware of the other’s attention. Everything
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about our attention is out in the open, and if one of us were to say, “It’s mine!”, the
intended referent would be obvious. Thus we went from a state of (merely) shared
attention to joint attention. But what has changed? Or, as Hobson’s title (2005) has it,
“What puts the jointness into joint attention?”
In recent years, the jointness question has received quite a lot of attention. It is agreed
that joint attention is a ubiquitous phenomenon, and that it is important to human social
interaction, because it helps us to coordinate our actions and beliefs. Since the termwas
introduced in developmental research by Jerome Bruner and colleagues (Bruner 1974;
Scaife and Bruner 1975), joint attention has been considered a milestone in children’s
social and cognitive development (Moore and Dunham 1995; Carpenter et al. 1998;
Adamson et al. 2019), and shortcomings in joint attention have been associated with
the onset of autism spectrum disorders (Hobson and Hobson 2011; Mundy 2016).
But there is no consensus on what joint attention is. The starting point for many
(though not all) authors is that the jointness of joint attention is “open” between both
attenders. It is fully and immediately transparent to them that they are jointly attending
to the sameobject or state of affairs (thus, e.g.,Bakeman andAdamson1984;Tomasello
1995; Peacocke 2005; Calabi 2008; Campbell 2011; Carpenter and Liebal 2011; Eilan
2015). The challenge is to go beyond the metaphor of openness.
One view is that joint attention is to be understood in terms of common knowledge,
or some related notion like common awareness, common belief, common acceptance,
etc. There are various ways of fleshing out this idea, but the simplest is to define that
we jointly attend to an object iff it is common knowledge between us that each of
us is attending to it. Assuming that common knowledge can be defined in terms of
knowledge (or a related epistemic notion like belief or awareness), this proposal is
reductionist in the sense that it defines joint attention in terms of individual mental
states.
An alternative to the knowledge-based approach is to view joint attention as a
primitive relation, which is irreducible to the individual states of its relata (e.g.,Calabi
2008; Seemann 2004). John Campbell’s (2005, 2011, 2018) “relational” theory is a
prominent representative of this view. On Campbell’s account, when jointly attending
to the cake, each of us experiences the other as jointly attending to the cake, such
that you are a constituent of my visual experience, as I am a constituent of yours.
Whatever epistemic significance joint attention has in coordinating our actions and
beliefs, it results from this sensory experiential character. Unlike the knowledge-based
approach, Campbell’s analysis is based on the idea that joint attention is “fundamen-
tally a phenomenon of sensory experience” (2011, p. 415) and seeks to avoid referring
to judgments, inferences, appeals to knowledge, beliefs, or any other higher cognitive
processes. For this reason, Campbell’s style of analysis has proved to be attractive to
cognitive and developmental psychologists (e.g.,Moll andMeltzoff 2011; Hobson and
Hobson 2011). Moreover, the relational view has been claimed to support and comple-
ment an interactionist approach to social cognition based on embodied, embedded, and
extended interactive processes (Gallagher 2010; León et al. 2019). In these and other
ways, the feasibility of the relational approach is critical to several lines of thinking
in social cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind and language.
We argue that Campbell’s relational account of joint attention fails to deliver on its
promises. In doing so, we do not wish to advocate the knowledge-based approach, let
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alone defend it against objections from Campbell or other critics. Rather, we intend
to assess the merits of the relational approach in its own right, and will argue that, at
several points, Campbell’s theory threatens to collapse into its competitor. Therefore,
we will need to discuss the knowledge-based view in some detail.
To begin with, Sect. 2 elaborates on the knowledge-based approach that serves as
the foil to Campbell’s relational account, which is presented in Sect. 3. Campbell’s
account is underdeveloped in several respects, and therefore we will need to consider
various ways of making it more precise. We then argue that the relational definition
of joint attention either results in an infinite regress of perceptual states or requires a
construal of the notion of “co-attention” that is substantially identicalwith the notion of
“normality” employed by knowledge-based theories, which, according to Campbell,
shouldn’t be part of an explanation of joint attention (Sect. 4). Finally, we discuss two
further issues having to do with attention monitoring (Sect. 5) and failures of joint
attention (Sect. 6).
The recurring theme throughout our discussion is that the problems which Camp-
bell’s theory runs into are due to tensions in his claim that joint attention is
“fundamentally a phenomenon of sensory experience”, and therefore not to be
explained in terms of knowledge, belief, or awareness (2011, p. 415, 2018, p. 120).
While joint attention undeniably involves sensory experience, our discussion suggests
that an explanation of the phenomenon will have to factor in at least some knowledge,
belief, or awareness.
2 The knowledge-based approach
Campbell presents his theory of joint attention as a superior alternative to the
knowledge-based approach. On the latter view, joint attention can be defined as fol-
lows:1
– A and B are jointly attending to x iff it is common knowledge between A and B
that each of them is attending to x.
It doesn’t matter for our purposes whether this particular definition is the best way
of dealing with joint attention in terms of common knowledge; nor does it matter
whether, e.g., common awareness, common belief, or common acceptance might be
preferable to common knowledge. The only thing that matters is that all analyses that
take this general approach have two features in common: they refer to cognitive states
and they entail that these states give rise to iterative structures like the following:
– p is common knowledge between A and B iff A knows that p, B knows that p, A
knows that B knows that p, B knows that A knows that p, and so on ad infinitum.
Structures like this are the fingerprint of common knowledge, common belief, and so
on (Lewis 1969; Schiffer 1972; Geurts 2019). On a knowledge-based account, it is
this iterative structure that is held to capture the jointness in joint attention.




It is important to be clear about the status of this iterative structure, for it is often
misunderstood as implying that A and B cannot have common knowledge unless
(i) they make an infinite number of inferences and (ii) they mentally represent the
outcomes of all these inferences. The first misunderstanding was addressed by David
Lewis (1969, p. 53) even before it arose: “Note that this is a chain of implications, not
steps in anyone’s actual reasoning.Therefore there is nothing improper about its infinite
length.” While this may not help very much to explain what common knowledge is, it
should have sufficed to dispel the notion that it requires an infinite number of inferences
as a precondition. Regrettably, Lewis’s remark was widely ignored in the subsequent
literature, but that is as it may be: objection (i) is merely a denial of Lewis’s remark,
and now that it has been dispensed with, objection (ii) falls by the wayside, too.
Having characterized common knowledge in terms of the iterative structure shown
above, it remains to be seen how common knowledge is achieved. Following Lewis
(1969) and Schiffer (1972), it is generally accepted that there are many types of finite
situations, or “bases” as Lewis calls them, that generate common knowledge. People
interacting with each other will soon find out that they share the same language, the
same social background, the same hobbies, and so on, and any of these commonalities
will serve as a basis for common knowledge. In the case of joint attention, part of the
relevant basis will be that A and B take each other to know “that if a ‘normal’ person
(i.e. a person with normal sense faculties, intelligence, and experience) has his eyes
open and his head facing an object of a certain size (etc.), then that person will see
that an object of a certain sort is before him” (Schiffer 1972, p. 31). If this normality
condition is not fulfilled, joint attention cannot be achieved. For example, if A knows
that B’s low eye pressure seriously distorts her vision, then A and B cannot jointly
attend to their cake.
The knowledge-based approach invites (but does not entail) the hypothesis that,
apart from the normality condition, joint attention may be affected by practically any
kind of background knowledge. Just as individual attention is driven by goals, inten-
tions, and beliefs, so is joint attention. Tomasello (2014) notes that in joint attention
I must be sensitive to the features of an object or situation that are relevant for you.
Just following your line of gaze is not enough (cf. Moll and Tomasello 2007). To illus-
trate, consider the following scenario. If you point at a tree, I can follow your pointing
gesture, but that does not tell me whether you are attending to the apples it carries,
its smooth trunk, or the fungus on its bark. Perhaps we have been out foraging for
apples or, alternatively, you have been tasked with the care of fungus-infected trees.
My perceptual experience will be the same in both scenarios, since our lines of sight
converge on the same tree. It is our shared background knowledge that enables me
to determine which aspects of the visual scene you are focusing on, and to engage in
joint attention with you.
The knowledge-based view is consistent with a range of positions on howmuch and
what kinds of background knowledge are required for joint attention. However, since
Campbell restricts his attention to knowledge-based theories that adopt the normality
condition, we will make the same restriction here.
Campbell (2005) criticizes the knowledge-based approach for being cognitively
demanding and psychologically unrealistic, because it requires infinitely many infer-
ences and infinitely many levels of mental representation. The same objection is made
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by Eilan (2005) and Carpenter and Liebal (2011), among others, and Calabi (2008)
goes so far as to suggest that the theory entails that joint attention requires a grasp of the
concept of infinity. As we have already seen, we maintain that this line of criticism is
a spurious one, and we will consider it no further. Nevertheless, and regardless of how
the knowledge-based approach fares, one can of course maintain that the relational
theory presents a viable alternative. We now turn to that account.
3 The relational theory of joint attention
On an orthodox analysis, perceptual experiences are constituted not only by our sur-
roundings, but also by our mental representations. Campbell’s theory of joint attention
extends his anti-representational theory of perception, which he calls “relational”. On
the relational view, “the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around
the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects
are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged
in relation to one another and to you” (Campbell 2002, p. 116; see also Martin 2004;
Travis 2004; Crane 2006). On this view, perception is not a matter of representing
objects, but involves a non-representational relation between the perceiver and the
token object perceived. Up to a point, this agrees with our intuitions. When we look
around the room,wewould normally say thatwe experience the room itself and its con-
tents. Therefore, Campbell’s account is a representative of what is sometimes called
a “naïve realist” view on perceptual experience.
Campbell construes perception as a three-place relation: “S perceives x as being F”,
where the F-term stands for something like the aspect under which x is perceived. If I
look around the room, I see the objects it contains as having certain intrinsic properties
and being arranged in certain ways relative to one another and to myself.2 Campbell
doesn’t discuss F-properties and -relations in any detail, which is unfortunate, because
they play a key role in his account of joint attention, as we will see. However, for
our purposes it suffices to note that, as defined by Campbell, perception is a purely
extensional relation, which entails that, if F and G are the same, “S perceives x as
being F” is equivalent to “S perceives x as being G”.
Campbell considers perception to be a primitive relation, in the sense that it is not
to be analyzed in such terms as “x causes S to have a representational content as
of something being F”, where S experiences this representational content (Campbell
2002, pp. 117-18). More generally, perception is a relation between subjects, objects,
properties, and relations that is irreducible to other mental states.3
Campbell’s analysis of joint attention builds on his relational account of perception:
On a relational view, joint attention is a primitive phenomenon of consciousness.
Just as the object you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can
2 This is Campbell’s (2002) analysis. In later work, he introduces “standpoints” as a further ingredient of
perception (2009). Although it may be that at least some F-relations can be subsumed under this notion, it
seems to us that Campbell’s views on “perceiving as” remain unaffected by its addition.
3 For critical assessments of the relational view of perception, see Burge (2005), Byrne and Logue (2008)
and Nanay (2014). For attempts to reconcile the relational and representational views, see Nanay (2015)
and De Sá Pereira (2016).
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be a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly
attending to the object. This is not to say that in a case of joint attention, the
other person will be an object of your attention. On the contrary, it is only the
object that you are attending to. It is rather that, when there is another personwith
whom you are jointly attending to the thing, the existence of that other person
enters into the individuation of your experience. The other person is there, as
co-attender, in the periphery of your experience. (Campbell 2005, p. 288)
On this account, joint attention involves an object x and two individuals who expe-
rience each other as co-attending. That is to say:
– A and B are jointly attending to x iff
– A perceives x as being co-attended by B, and
– B perceives x as being co-attended by A.
Here the F-term of relational perception à la Campbell is instantiated with the property
of being co-attended by the other. Thus, if I am alone eyeing the cake on the table, and
you arrive to engage in joint attention with me, then there is a change in my perception
of the cake: I now see it as being co-attended to by you.
But what does it mean for two people to co-attend to an object? Campbell doesn’t
say, but the most natural answer, it seems to us, is that co-attention is just a variant
expression for joint attention: A and B perceive an object as being co-attended by the
other iff they jointly attend to it. Alternatively, and perhaps less likely, co-attention
and joint attention may be distinct concepts. We will consider both options shortly.
According to Campbell, joint attention differs from other forms of simultaneous
attention in two respects. If A and B are jointly attending to x, then first, A and B
monitor eachother’s attention, and second,A’s attention is oneof the factors controlling
B’s attention, and vice versa (cf.Tomasello 1995, p. 107). In line with his relational
principles, Campbell sees attention monitoring and control as relations that are to be
fleshed out in causal terms. For example, Campbell stipulates that, in order for joint
attention to be achieved, B’s continued attention to x must be one of the causal factors
for A’s continuing to attend to x, and vice versa, A’s continued attention to x must be
one of the causal factors for B’s continuing to attend to x (Campbell 2005, p. 289).
Campbell assumes that “this coordination of attention may involve the use of sub-
personal mechanisms, rather than explicit, personal-level thoughts about the direction
of the other person’s attention” (2005, p. 288). Here the personal/subpersonal dis-
tinction coincides with the introspectable/non-introspectable distinction, and personal
mental states are taken to include sensations, emotions, beliefs, desires, and rational
and deliberate thinking. The subpersonal processes for monitoring and control cannot
account for the jointness of joint attention, because joint attention is a personal-level
phenomenon and “it is hard to see what [these subpersonal processes] contribute to the
subject’s psychological life” (Campbell 2011, p. 416). The jointness in joint attention
is a personal-level state. This is why Campbell seeks to explain joint attention in terms
of the conscious experience of having the other as a co-attender. On Campbell’s view,
it is precisely in virtue of its perceptual experiential character that joint attention can
have the epistemic significance that it has.
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Campbell maintains that his relational theory of joint attention is free of the difficul-
ties that he and others associate with the knowledge-based approach. First, it doesn’t
involve the infinitely iterating structures that are the hallmark of knowledge-based
theories. Second, it doesn’t appeal to background knowledge, and in particular, it
doesn’t appeal to anything like the normality condition, which on a knowledge-based
account is instrumental in generating these iterative structures. In short, on a relational
analysis, joint attention is defined in terms of perceptual experience (Campbell 2011,
p. 415). In the following sections, we argue that this position is untenable.
4 Co-attention
As a matter of logical necessity, co-attention and joint attention are either the same
thing or not. Peacocke has noted that, if co-attention and joint attention are the same
thing, the notion of a co-attender presupposes the propertywhich is to be explained, i.e.
the openness of joint attention (2005, p. 300).Nevertheless,Campbell’s owndiscussion
suggests rather strongly that, for him, joint attention and co-attention are identical: to
be a co-attender is just to stand in the primitive three-place experiential relation, with
another co-attender, to a common object (2011, p. 420). Since joint attention is an
extensional relation, this entails that, if x = x′, then A and B are jointly attending to
x if and only if they are jointly attending to x′ (2011, p. 424). Thus, it follows that, if
A and B jointly attend to x:
– A perceives x as being co-attended by B,
– B perceives x as being co-attended by A,
– A perceives x as being perceived by B as being co-attended by A,
– B perceives x as being perceived by A as being co-attended by B,
– A perceives x as being perceived byB as being perceived byA as being co-attended
by B,
– B perceives x as being perceived byA as being perceived byB as being co-attended
by A,
– and so on ad infinitum.
So now joint attention involves the same sort of infinite iterations that, according to
Campbell, invalidate the knowledge-based approach. Hence, in this respect, Camp-
bell’s theory turns out to mimic the knowledge-based approach. By his own lights,
this is an unwanted result, since part of the motivation for claiming that “joint atten-
tion is a primitive phenomenon of consciousness”, is to avoid the complex iterations
of mental states that plague the knowledge-based approach (Campbell 2005). While
Campbell is not fully clear on the notion of primitiveness, it is often assumed that an
infinite regress is blocked just because joint attention is a primitive relation (e.g. Calabi
2008; Seemann 2004; Eilan 2015). We fail to see how this line of defence might work.
Consider the following case. In most versions of propositional logic, conjunction is a
primitive, non-reductive relation, in the sense that it cannot be reduced to other rela-
tions (other versions may take disjunction or implication to be primitive instead). This




– p & p & q,
– p & p & p & q,
– p & p & p & p & q,
– and so on ad infinitum.
Evidently, primitiveness in itself does not impede recursion, and there is no reason to
suppose that the primitiveness of joint attention will block the infinite regress pictured
above. As Campbell’s defines it, co-attendance may not be reducible to other individ-
ual mental states, but that doesn’t prevent the definition from generating a recursive
regress.What is crucial to the regress is that the relation is extensional. If primitiveness
is meant to resolve the issue, we are owed a positive explanation of what it is and how
it accomplishes this feat.
Thus, the assumption that co-attention is joint attention, which Campbell seems
to subscribe to, leads into major trouble for his account. Therefore, let’s consider
the possibility that co-attention and joint attention are not the same thing, and let’s
grant, if only for the sake of the argument, that this will block the infinite regress
that would otherwise ensue. According to Campbell, when we are engaged in joint
attention there is a difference between how I am related to the co-attended object and
how I am related to you. Each person is “there” and enters the other’s experience, “as
co-attender” (Campbell 2011, p. 419). We will not try to provide a full-dress definition
of co-attention, but will merely consider what are likely to be some of the minimal
conditions that must hold for someone to enter another person’s perceptual experience
as a co-attender.
In order to experience B as co-attender, A must be able to recognize that B co-
attends to x with her. Apart from the fact that this is a natural assumption to make, it
is also in line with what Campbell writes about other F-properties:
To experience the shape of a solid object you must have some capacity to rec-
ognize manifest sameness of shape across movements by you or by the object.
Otherwise it is hard to see how you could be said to be encountering the property
of three-dimensional shape at all. (Campbell 2009, p. 288)
By analogy, having the capacity to recognize co-attention when one encounters it
is a necessary precondition for joint attention. What does this capacity involve? For
starters, a plausible candidate is the ability to recognize the other as an animate entity,
separate from oneself, and to sense, however minimally, the other’s agency (e.g. that
they have goals different from one’s own). But clearly this won’t suffice for me to see
you as a co-attender rather than merely as a person who happens to be looking in the
same direction, for example, or who is incapable of looking in the first place. Thus
we are led to suppose that the ability to recognize co-attention requires the ability
to include as candidate co-attenders people whose line of sight intersects with the
target object, and exclude the blind, blindfolded, comatose, and so on. But these are
precisely the sort of requirements that make up the normality condition on which the
knowledge-based view is based.
This is bad news for Campbell’s account for two reasons. First, because he explicitly
seeks to avoid any appeals to knowledge, beliefs, or awareness of the two participants
(Campbell 2018, p. 120). Secondly, because on the knowledge-based view, the nor-
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mality condition is the linchpin in generating the endless iterations of psychological
states that Campbell rejects. Again, we have come to a point at which the relational
account threatens to converge with the knowledge-based account.
The key observation on which the foregoing argument is based is just that the kind
of content that seems to be needed to flesh out the notion of co-attention is the same
as what goes into the normality condition. No assumptions have been made about the
nature of that content, except for the fact that, if this content is a prerequisite for my
joint attentional perceptual experience, it cannot itself be accounted for in terms of
that experience. This point bears emphasizing because the normality condition has
been held to require a grasp of a concept of psychological normality and all that goes
with it (e.g., Peacocke 2005). As far as we can tell, that is not the case. Whatever kind
of content is involved in co-attention will work for normality, too (cf. Calabi 2008).
As discussed in Sect. 2, while the knowledge-based view is consistent with the
hypothesis that, in principle, joint attention may be affected by any kind of knowl-
edge, it allows for a range of positions on how much and what kinds of knowledge
are required for joint attention; the normality condition may be seen as an attempt
at capturing at least some of that knowledge. In the foregoing we were led to con-
clude that, whatever co-attention may be, it seems likely to involve the same kind of
knowledge. The bottom line is that at least some knowledge must be involved in any
analysis joint attention. If we try to do without any form of knowledge whatsoever, a
feasible account of joint attention is outside our reach. Therefore, the relational view
is on the wrong track. In the remainder of this paper we discuss two further issues that
reinforce this conclusion.
5 Causal monitoring
On Campbell’s view, when we are engaged in joint attention, you are a constitutive
part of my experience. For this to happen, some causal conditions must be met (Camp-
bell 2005, p. 288). Part of your causal contribution to my experience is that you are
continuously attending to the object that I’m attending to. More formally:
– A’s continued attention to x must be one of the factors causally sustaining B’s
continuing to attend to x, and
– B’s continued attention to x must be one of the factors causally sustaining A’s
continuing to attend to x.
These conditions can be interpreted strongly or weakly. On a strong interpretation,
causalmonitoringmust be literally continuous, i.e. uninterrupted. This interpretation is
suggested by Campbell’s (2005, p. 289) ownwords, which we have reproduced almost
verbatim. On the weak interpretation, monitoring need not be continuous in order to
sustain joint attention. It is not hard to see that, in both versions, Campbell’s causal
conception of monitoring is problematic: on the strong interpretation it is unrealistic,
and on the weak interpretation it is hard to see how it could be causal. Since the
two interpretations are jointly exhaustive, it is doubtful that the mutual monitoring on
which joint attention is generally agreed to be based is a causal relation.
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Consider the strong version first. On this interpretation, you have to keep looking
at our cake without interruption in order for our state of joint attention to persist. If
you divert your gaze even for a second, the causal connection is broken, I cease to
experience you as a co-attender, and our joint attention is no more. This is clearly
wrong. When we jointly attend to our cake, for example, we typically alternate gazes
between the cake and each other; if both of us were fixedly staring at the cake without
checking with each other every once in a while, we wouldn’t be engaged in joint
attention. Hence, on a strong interpretation, causal monitoring fails to account for the
facts.
On a weak interpretation, your eye gaze is allowed to shift between the cake and
myself (and perhaps other objects as well). But then how can we account in purely
causal terms for the difference between a solid 10-minute bout of joint attention and an
interval of the same length during which our joint attention is briefly interrupted every
now and then? On a knowledge-based model, joint attention may be sustained, in part,
by informational processes that enable us to distinguish between genuine interruptions
and merely apparent ones. For example, if it is common knowledge between A and B
that each is equally interested in x and the other, then alternating gazes between each
other and x are more likely to be experienced as joint attention than if it is common
ground that x is of predominant interest for both A and B. It is hard to see how such
observations could be accommodated by a purely causal model and the perceptual
relation it is meant to support. To explore this point a bit further, we turn to our last
topic: failures of joint attention.
6 When joint attention fails
Once again, we have been jointly attending to our cake for a while, when you start
daydreaming about your next holiday, and although you’re still gazing at the cake,
your mind is now elsewhere. Hence, our episode of joint attention has come to an
end, but as far as I’m concerned we are still looking at the cake together. How is this
possible? In his 2011 article Campbell diagnoses the situation as follows:
Being an experiential relation, like “___ sees ___”, it is introspectable: X can
tell just by reflection that he or she is co-attending with Y to Z. However, here as
so often, introspection is not an infallible source of knowledge. You may think
you are co-attending with Y to Z even though Y left long ago. (Campbell 2011,
p. 419)
Based on introspection, I believe that we are jointly attending to the cake while in
fact we’re doing no such thing anymore. On Campbell’s account, this is a scenario
that theories of direct perceptual experience are all too familiar with. Consider the
following experiment. A subject is looking at a tennis ball which, during the 200
milliseconds of an eye blink, is replaced with another, qualitatively indistinguishable
ball. So our subject doesn’t notice the change, and as far as she is concerned her
perceptual experience is the same as before. For a relational theorist like Campbell the
case is clear cut: the replacement causes the subject to enter a new perceptual state,
even if she fails to notice it (cf. Martin 2004; Schellenberg 2010).
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This claim is controversial, but it is the logical consequence of the premise that,
in veridical perception, external objects and their properties “partly constitute one’s
conscious experience” (Martin 1997, p. 83). This premise clashes with the intuition
that two conscious perceptual experiences that are indistinguishable for a subject are
necessarily the same (Martin 1997, p. 81). It is generally agreed that these two notions
are difficult if not impossible to square. However, we will not address that issue here,
and merely want to point out that, compared to the tennis ball experiment, cases of
false joint attention raise additional issues for the relational account.
First, whereas in the tennis ball experiment the perceived objects are numerically
distinct, in our case of failing joint attention it is just the fact that you cease to pay
attention to the cake that, according to Campbell, causes a change in my perceptual
experience. By hypothesis, there are no external factors that might causally account
for my change of perceptual state. Only neural changes in you might conceivably
qualify for this job. Therefore, Campbell owes us an account of how covert changes
in the brain states of one person can affect perceptual experiences in another.
Secondly, since the relational view allows for dissociations between my perceptual
experience and my beliefs about my perceptual experience, it also allows for the
possibility that I am engaged in joint attention but mistakenly believe that I am not.
But this seems to be at odds with the key feature of joint attention that, as noted in
the introduction, all parties agree on: joint attention is public, it has a special kind of
openness or mutual manifestness. On Campbell’s account, this openness is constituted
by my perceptual experience and yours, and therefore I can mistakenly believe that
we are not engaged in joint attention because I am wrong about my experience. This
sounds like a downright contradiction to us. It is one thing to suppose that I canwrongly
believe that we are engaged in joint attention; this is a possibility that every theory
should allow for. But it is quite another thing to suppose that I can wrongly believe that
we are not engaged in joint attention. This is a possibility that, in our view, should be
ruled out by the very notion of joint attention, and if this much is true, it is problematic
that Campbell’s account fails to do so.
7 Conclusion
The relational approach has been touted as a superior alternative to the knowledge-
based approach, and has been claimed to provide an account of joint attention anchored
in its perceptual experiential character, which avoids an infinite regress of inferences,
does not require conceptual understanding, and generally imposes minimal demands
on processing and representation. For these reasons, it has proved to be attractive to
philosophers and psychologists concerned with social cognition and its development.
In the foregoing we have argued that Campbell’s theory is untenable, and at several
points comes perilously close to collapsing into its knowledge-based competitor. To
begin with, the relational analysis either results in an infinite regress of psychological
states or necessitates elaborations of the notion of “co-attention” that make it indis-
tinguishable from the notion of “normality” employed by knowledge-based theories.
Further, the theory requires a causal notion of attention monitoring which is either
too strict to be realistic or so loose that it cannot be a purely causal notion in the
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first place. Finally, the theory implies a counter-intuitive dissociation between my per-
ceptual experience and my beliefs about my perceptual experience, which becomes
problematic when considering cases of joint-attention failure.
Where do we go from here? The relational view is predicated on the assumption
that joint attention is fundamentally a type of primitive perceptual state, not itself
susceptible to explanation in terms of the knowledge, beliefs, or awareness of the two
participants (Campbell 2018, p. 120). Our discussion suggests that the difficulties the
relational view faces may be tackled by abandoning this assumption, and by taking
into account the knowledge, beliefs, or informational states of each participant in
joint attention. Of course, joint attention certainly includes perceptual experiential
aspects. Our discussion of the relational view suggests, however, that these perceptual
aspects are not sufficient for an account of joint attention. Further work in a theoretical
explanation of joint attention may do well by taking into account the combination of
sensory experience and individual epistemic states.
To sum up, we believe that our arguments raise serious issues for theories of joint
attention that adopt a relational take on perceptual experience. More generally, they
suggest that theories anchored in perceptual experience will have to factor in at least
some knowledge, belief, or awareness into the analysis of joint attention.
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Paper II: Opening up the Openness
of Joint Attention
Abstract
The ability to engage in joint attention, in which two individuals attend to the
same object or event together, is considered fundamental for language learn-
ing, for understanding others and for joint actions. Joint attention is often
defined as a mutually open, or transparent relation between co-attenders. But
how should this openness be characterised? Two broad theoretical views have
been proposed. One view reductively accounts for the mutual awareness char-
acteristic of joint attention in terms of individual mental states and properties.
According to non-reductive views, in contrast, mutual awareness is based on
some primitive intersubjective relation, which is irreducible to the individual
states of its relata. I argue that tensions in these approaches arise from the
attempt to address both normative and cognitive explananda simultaneously.
Both approaches are primarily designed to tackle the normative epistemolo-
gical concerns of joint attention, and their problems arise when they conflate
these concerns with psychological ones. Drawing from evidence in develop-
mental and cognitive psychology, I outline the case for a cognitive-first ac-
count of joint attention based on a weaker notion of openness and mutual
awareness. I conclude by assessing the epistemic implications of this account.
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“I think (and I think Hume did too) that, insofar as it’s about the analysis of
justification and the like, epistemology hasn’t really got much to do with
psychology.” (Fodor, 2003, 4)
1 Introduction
Two people sit at a table with a piece of cake between them. They look at the
cake, exchange glances and smile. They are thus both attending to the cake.
Importantly, they are both at the same time aware of each other’s attention. If
one of them was to say “Grandma made it”, the referent would be clear to both
of them. This is a paradigmatic case of joint attention.
It is widely agreed that joint attention, in which two individuals attend to
the same object or event together, plays an important role in language de-
velopment and communication, in joint action, and in the progressive un-
derstanding that others can have different perspectives than our own. More
generally, joint attention supports the development of mentalising, the abil-
ity to comprehend other people’s mental lives (Moore & Dunham, 1995; Car-
penter et al., 1998; Mundy, 2018). Within philosophy, joint attention has been
considered essential for the ability to distinguish self from other (Bermúdez,
1998), the constitution of a common ground for communication (Clark, 1992),
and the concept a shared objective world, where mind-independent objects
are attended in common (Davidson, 1999; Campbell, 2011). However, there
is scant agreement on how joint attention should be analysed and how it is
involved in all these capacities.
This paper aims to contribute to theoretical research on joint attention by
examining the notion of a shared “openness” between co-attenders. Most re-
searchers agree that a key feature of the state of joint attention is that it is
public or “out in the open” among the co-attenders. It is fully and immedi-
ately “transparent”, or “mutually manifest”, to them that they are jointly at-
tending to the same object or state of affairs (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984;
Tomasello, 1995; Eilan, 2005; Peacocke, 2005; Calabi, 2008; Campbell, 2011;
Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). This feature puts the jointness in joint attention
and distinguishes it from cases where we attend to the same object unilater-
ally, completely unaware of each other. Co-attenders are mutually aware of
their shared attention to the same target. But how should this notion of mu-
tual awareness be analysed? Two broad theoretical views have been proposed.
One view reductively accounts for the mutual awareness characteristic of joint
attention in terms of individual mental states and properties. According to
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non-reductive views, in contrast, mutual awareness is based on some primit-
ive intersubjective relation, which is irreducible to the individual states of its
relata.
I have two goals in this paper. First, I argue that much of the debate
between reductive and non-reductive views arise through the conflation
of two distinct explanatory aims: the aim of explaining the normative role
of joint attention in justifying joint endeavours, and the cognitive aim of
explicating the psychological capacities involved in joint attention. Reductive
and non-reductive approaches are primarily concerned with the normative
aim, and their problems arise when they extend their scope to tackle the
cognitive aim (section 2). Both approaches, I argue, turn out to be concep-
tually equivalent when the focus is strictly normative. Second, I outline the
case for a cognitive-first account of joint attention based on a weaker notion
of mutual awareness, in line with empirical evidence from developmental
psychology (section 3). I suggest that mutual awareness in joint attention
is not something co-attenders must arrive at, but that it is often implicitly
assumed, and that we must (un)learn that other people may not attend to the
same things we attend. I conclude by returning to the normative question,
assessing how this proposal can address the epistemic justificatory role of
joint attention in our social lives.
2 Assessing the reductive and non-reductive views
2.1 Explanatory aims
It is commonly assumed that a primary functional role for joint attention is
to provide a rational basis for further coordinated activities between agents.
Joint attention is thus considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for
individuals to engage in collective activities (2003); and plays an essential role
in the constitution of the common ground involved in communication (Clark,
1992; Bruner, 1995; Tomasello, 2008). John Campbell shares in the current
consensus by associating the openness of joint attention with this functional
role:
[W]hatever else is true of it, joint attention has an “openness” about
it — there’s some sense in which the situation is “open” to both at-
tendees in a case of joint attention — in virtue of which joint at-
tention ordinarily plays a distinctive role in rational, coordinated
action. (Campbell, 2011, 417)
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On the other hand, joint attention is a psychological phenomenon, and any
theoretical analysis will be constrained by psychological plausibility. For ex-
ample, Christopher Mole (2017) notes that, “since joint attention is achieved
by young children, its achievement cannot plausibly be thought to make any
sophisticated intellectual demands” (cf. Roessler, 2005). We need to spell out
what are the mental and cognitive requirements for joint attention: how is
openness achieved? An account of the openness of joint attention is therefore
seen as a necessary step in addressing these two different explananda:
i. Normative: How does joint attention rationally support joint beliefs and
joint actions, and yields shared knowledge of our environment?
ii. Cognitive: What cognitive capacities and mental processes or under-
standing are involved in joint attention, which even infants and young
children may be capable of having?
Though they needn’t be, these two questions are often tackled at once in the
current debate. Supposedly, the openness of joint attention must be concep-
tualised in such a way that it provides a normative epistemic basis for rational
behaviour regarding the co-attended object, and simultaneously shed light on
the mental wherewithal necessary to achieve said openness. I examine the
contrast between reductive and non-reductivist accounts of joint attention in
light of these two different explanatory aims. Both accounts take the normat-
ive question (i) as a starting point and motivation. It is usually assumed that
the functional role of joint attention is to provide the categorical grounds that
allow subjects to engage rationally in joint projects concerning the jointly at-
tended object, including communicative speech referring to the object. In the
rest of this section, I show how the problems for both accounts arise only when
they are taken to simultaneously address the cognitive question (ii).
2.2 The reductive approach
The two broad theoretical approaches to joint attention tend to give priority to
slightly distinct notions of openness. On an epistemic interpretation of open-
ness, a situation S is open between A and B when S is epistemically shared
between A and B. The reductive approach is paradigmatic in taking epistemic
openness as the starting point. While this view does not deny the experien-
tial character of joint attention, it holds instead that this character is better
accounted for in terms of its epistemic structure. According to this approach,
epistemic openness can be explained by reducing it to the individual mental
states of each co-attender. Reductive views tend to analyse the openness of
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joint attention in terms of common knowledge or similar notions such as mu-
tual awareness, constructed in line with the analyses from Lewis (1969) and
Schiffer (1972). On this definition, A and B are jointly attending to x when they
are mutually aware, or enjoy common knowledge, that each of them is attend-
ing to x. Common knowledge is defined as giving rise to iterative structures
like the following:
p is common knowledge between A and B iff
• A knows that p,
• B knows that p,
• A knows that B knows that p,
• B knows that A knows that p,
• and so on, ad infinitum.
On this construal, joint attention involves nested psychological states that
both A and B would have to entertain about each other. This is the hallmark of
recursive mindreading, where one subject attributes mental states to another,
which, in turn, refer to the first subject’s own mental states. Typical criticisms
of this approach centre on the requirement of recursive mindreading. One
argument from phenomenology notes that the openness in joint attention is
immediate and effortless, so that it is implausible that joint attention requires
recursive mindreading (e.g. Gallagher, 2011). Related arguments point to
the computational complexity of recursive mindreading, arguing that it is
intellectually demanding and psychologically implausible even for adults
(Eilan, 2005; Campbell, 2018).
One key argument against the reductive approach based on recursive itera-
tions appeals to “coordinated-attack” scenarios (Wilby, 2010; Campbell, 2005,
2018).1
Coordinated-attack scenario: Two individuals in separate booths
must both attack the same target among many, at the same time.
For this, they will have to coordinate their individual actions. Ad-
ditionally, there is always a non-zero chance of distorted commu-
nication between booths, so that when one individual has chosen
a target and communicates this to the other, they will not know
1The coordinated-attack problem was first introduced in its current form by Akkoyunlu
et al. (1975) in the context of dynamical systems engineering and, while it soon became a key
fixture in epistemic logic, it had little to do with mental representations and psychological
processes.
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for sure whether the communication has been received. Suppos-
ing that the second individual does receive the message specifying
the target, they could, in turn, send a message back to confirm re-
ceipt of the target. But, again, they will not be sure whether this
confirmation has been received. To make a coordinated attack ra-
tional, both individuals will have to go through an infinite iteration
of messages confirming the preceding confirmation.
Coordinated-attack scenarios are often assumed to show that no finite itera-
tion of inferences will allow the participants to engage in rational coordinated
attack and secure victory. Yet in normal situations, where we are both present
in the same physical space, we can easily arrive at a successful coordinated
outcome. When both individuals and the target are all co-present, as in most
normal circumstances, then “everything is out in the open to such an extent
that we can rationally attack” (Campbell, 2005: 292). So how do we do it, given
that we cannot perform infinite inferences?
For Wilby (2010), the coordinated-attack problem “highlights that once
one gets embroiled in supposing that an act of transparent communication or
shared knowledge requires a set of hierarchical to-ing and fro-ing about who
knows what, then there will be no end to the matter” (my emphasis). Going
up only two or three levels up the recursive chain will not suffice. As Wilby
(2010) and Campbell (2018) note, for any level in the chain, that level does
not lead to openness or mutual awareness, or else will require a further step
in the recurse chain2. The conclusion of the coordinated-attack argument is
what Wilby calls as disastrous “paradox” for the reductive approach: mutual
awareness requires an infinite recursion of overlapping mental states, but this
requirement is psychologically implausible.
There are two points where the argument from coordinated-attack fails.
First, this rendering of the “paradox” relies on the assumption that on the
iterative approach, openness itself is the result or end-point of the iterations.
On this assumption, it follows that the openness in normal joint attention
scenarios is similar to the openness which the individuals in our separate
booths are infinitely pursuing, which spells problems for the reductionist. Yet
the reductionist is not committed to make such assumption in the first place.
Second, there is nothing in the coordinated-attack scenario that implies that
2One may suggest that people just reason two or three levels up the hierarchy and then
conclude their knowledge is shared. This is an empirical, not a logical, suggestion; and one
with no evidential support (e.g., Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Thomas et al., 2014). The approach im-
plicit in this suggestion is normative-first: start with a logical, normative theory, and truncate
it to fit what (we think) humans can do. I suggest adopting instead a cognitive-first approach
and evaluate any normative implications thereafter.
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the iterations must be actually represented in the mind of each individual
in a case of joint attention. This construal of the argument relies on the
convergence of both normative and cognitive aims described above. The view
that a reductive approach to joint attention involves recursive mindreading is
based on normative analyses of common knowledge such as those by Lewis
and Schiffer. Traditionally, their approach presumes that there are situations
with some finite conditions, out of which the infinite iterations logically
follow. What makes a situation a common knowledge situation are those
finite conditions, not the recursive iterations themselves, nor their result or
end-point. In other words, the iterations arise as logical implications which
follow from some given finite situation, and which are not necessarily repres-
ented in anyone’s reasoning (Lewis, 1969). Coordinated-attack scenarios only
show that the individuals in their separate booths lack the appropriate finite
conditions.
To date, providing a good account of those finite conditions has been
proved somewhat problematic, but only when, in addition, such conditions
must also account for the psychological processes and mental wherewithal
necessary for joint attention or common knowledge. If we do away with this
cognitive explananda, we are left only with the normative question. Under
the normative aim, the openness of joint attention can be seen as a purely
normative epistemological notion, and there is nothing psychological about
it. Analyses of joint attention and mutual awareness in the style of Schiffer’s
and Lewis’ are not necessarily committed to an infinite regression of mental
states. They are not in principle committed to any view about psychological
processes at all, and so assuming that they must involve the performance of
an infinite chain of mental states is a misapplication of a normative analysis
into a psychological straightjacket.3
This conclusion leaves unanswered what mutual awareness is, psycholo-
gically speaking, as a mental state enjoyed by both adults and infants. In other
words, the upshot is that we are giving up the cognitive explanandum of joint
attention.
2.3 The non-reductive approach
Prominent non-reductive approaches concentrate instead on experiential
openness (Campbell, 2005, 2018; Seemann, 2019; Wilby, 2010). On a non-
reductive view, a situation S is open between A and B when S is fully present
3For a purely normative treatment of phenomena that share the openness under consider-
ation, particularly the common ground between interactants and its role in communication,
see Geurts (2019).
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to the consciousness of A and B (see Calabi, 2008). It is in virtue of its phe-
nomenal character that joint attention plays an epistemic role in justifying
shared beliefs and joint activities. On this approach, there is a primitive
intersubjective relation behind joint attention, which cannot be analysed any
further. John Campbell thus proposes that joint attention is a primitive type
of conscious state (2005; 2018). Just as the object you see can be a constituent
of your experience, so too it can be a constituent of your experience that
the other person is, with you, jointly attending to the object. Naomi Eilan
argues that joint attention is grounded in experiences of “you-awareness”
and “communication-as-connection”, which are primitive conscious states
(2015). Following Campbell, Axel Seemann (2019) argues that our perceptual
experience during joint attention is a primitive joint state. What each of us
experiences cannot be reduced to our individual psychological states, but is
determined by the triadic spatial arrangement between us and the common
object of our attention (Seemann, 2019, 75).
Campbell’s analysis, in particular, is based on the premise that joint atten-
tion can be explained fully in terms of perceptual experience, and thus is not
susceptible to an explanation in terms of the knowledge, beliefs, or awareness
of the two participants (Campbell, 2018, 120). For this reason, it has proved
to be an attractive theoretical position for cognitive and developmental psy-
chologists (e.g. Moll & Meltzoff, 2011; Hobson & Hobson, 2011). One serious
criticism of this approach is that it simply embeds in the analysis of openness
or mutual awareness the property that is to be explained, i.e., the openness
of joint attention (Peacocke, 2005). Further problems arise due to the nar-
row focus on perceptual experience. Since the non-reductive approach allows
for dissociations between one’s perceptual experience and one’s beliefs about
that experience, it also allows for the possibility that one is engaged in joint
attention but mistakenly believes that is not (Battich & Geurts, 2020).
As it is perhaps already evident, the key motivation for non-reductive ap-
proaches is to address the normative explananda of joint attention, and its
problems — or rather, its limitations — arise when it is also taken to provide in-
sight into the cognitive question. When focusing exclusively on the normative
question, however, the openness of joint attention becomes merely a descrip-
tion of phenomenal aspects of experience. Being primitive, these aspects can-
not be further explained. But neither do they inform us about the psycholo-
gical capacities behind joint attention. On the non-reductive approach, joint
attention is treated from a third person point of view, as it merely asks whether
an external ascription that A and B jointly attend to x is true. A description
of a primitive intersubjective relation between co-attenders can make such
ascriptions true, but this description will be entirely silent on the psycholo-
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gical states of each individual (cf. Schmitz, 2015, 239). The upshot, of course,
is that we are giving up the cognitive explanandum (aim ii).
2.4 Conceptual equivalence between iterative and primitivist
approaches
For primitivists like Campbell (2005) and Seemann (2019), the state of mutual
awareness in joint attention is a factive state. You cannot be aware that of the
other person is currently co-attending with you to the same perceptual target,
unless that person is, in fact, a co-attender. Of course, you could be wrong
about your co-attendance, but then you would not be in a state of joint atten-
tion. The factive character of the mental states of each co-attender is also usu-
ally assumed for the reductive, iterative approach. Two people are mutually
aware of p only when both of them are equally justified to follow the infinite lo-
gical implications of their joint epistemic state. Interestingly, the assumption
that the mental states of each co-attender are factive implies that the iterative
and primitivist views are conceptually equivalent — at least under some ver-
sions of each view. In particular, the equivalence holds for Schiffer’s analysis
of common knowledge, commonly taken as a paradigm of the reductive, iter-
ative approach when applied to the openness in joint attention. The brilliance
of Schiffer analysis is that it proposes a finite basis for common knowledge, out
of which the iterations would follow logically. Therefore, it does not necessit-
ate an infinite recursion of mental states, to be represented in the minds of
each individual. On Schiffer’s analysis, A and B mutually know that p iff there
are properties F and G such that:
1. A is F.
2. B is G.
3. Both being F and being G are sufficient for knowing that p, that A is F, and
that B is G.
4. For any proposition q, if both being F and being G are sufficient for know-
ing that q, then both being F and being G are sufficient for knowing that
both being F and being G are sufficient for knowing that q. (Schiffer,
1972, 34-5)
Given this finite base, the infinite number of iterations characteristic of com-
mon knowledge can be generated by feeding (3) to the recursive clause in (4),
and reapplying (4) to each new result over and over. This analysis relies heav-
ily on the generating properties F and G, which, Schiffer proposes, refer to the
property of being “a visibly ‘normal’, open-eyed, conscious person”:
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If a “normal” person (i.e., a person with normal sense faculties, in-
telligence, and experience) has his eyes open and his head facing
an object of a certain size (etc.), then that person will see that an
object of a certain sort is before him. (Schiffer, 1972, 31)
Moreover, people know that normal people will behave in this way, and they
can easily tell when someone is normal (Schiffer, 1972, 33). For this analysis
to work, the property of “being normal”, however, must be relativized to the
specific situation in which the co-attenders currently are (Wilby, 2010). Some
situations will require, for example, that assumptions about normal hearing,
rather than normal sight, be included in the normality properties F and G to
allow for common knowledge towards an auditory event in the environment.
Importantly, Wilby (2010) has shown that F and G are more intimately related
than Schiffer initially presumed. Schiffer’s four clauses, in particular (3), to-
gether with the facticity assumption (which makes knowledge a factive state
by definition: if X knows p, then p is true), imply that the two generating prop-
erties F and G are necessary and sufficient conditions for each other:
1. Both being F and being G are sufficient for knowing that p, that A is F, and
that B is G (assumption from Schiffer)
2. If X knows that q, then q is true (facticity assumption)
3. If A is F, then A knows that B is G (from 1)
4. If B is G, then B knows that A is F (from 1)
5. If A is F, then B is G (from 2 and 3)
6. If B is G, then A is F (from 2 and 4)
7. A is F iff B is G (from 5 and 6) (Wilby, 2010, 91)
Given the biconditional relation between F and G, these properties can be lo-
gically replaced by a primitive relational property H, so that H iff F and G. Thus,
Schiffer’s analysis of common knowledge turns out to be logically equivalent
to an analysis including the single intersubjective property H, where A and B
are both H, and each of them can only be H when the other person is likewise
H. But now the analysis includes a primitive intersubjective element irredu-
cible to the mental states and properties of each individual. Schiffer’s ana-
lysis of common knowledge is conceptually identical to a primitivist analysis.
Common knowledge, under Schiffer’s analysis together with the facticity as-
sumption, is a relational state irreducible to the individual cognitive states of
the individuals in question (Wilby, 2010, 92). It is important to be clear about
the implications of this equivalence. Wilby suggests that the equivalence, to-
gether with the psychological implausibility of the iterative approach, arbit-
rate in favour of the primitivist approach to common knowledge and related
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epistemic notions, such as mutual awareness and joint attention. This sug-
gestion is unwarranted, however. Wilby’s argument demonstrating the equi-
valence between the two views constitutes a redrawing of the normative as-
pects of common knowledge. In principle, the primitive relational property H
has little to do with psychology and the actual mental states of an individual
(Wilby, 2010, 93, admits as much).
One could go further, of course, and interpret H as an irreducible joint
psychological state. But this interpretation only brings back the limitations
of the primitivist approach: the openness of joint attention becomes an ir-
reducible psychological state, and, as Wilby himself notes, it is suspect how
much explanatory work such irreducible notion can play in psychological the-
ories and experimental research. In particular, the cognitive explananda is
left untouched: what mental processes and understanding are involved in
joint attention, which even infants and young children may be capable of hav-
ing? This defeatist outcome is due, in part, to the equivalence relying on the
facticity assumption. While this clause is commonly assumed for knowledge
(Williamson, 2000), it arguably does not hold for psychologically-determined
states such as beliefs and awareness. It is dubious that a person’s psycholo-
gical sense of being in a situation of joint attention leads, as a matter of logical
necessity, to joint attention being true.
The conceptual equivalence of iterative and primitivist analyses holds
when both analyses are strictly considered as epistemic normative theories.
Their unreconcilable differences arise only when they are taken to address, in
addition, the cognitive question regarding the psychological processes behind
joint attention. If we are interested in the psychological states of real humans
and children, and not just in the rational states of epistemic agents, then we
should acknowledge the limitations of such “normative-first” analyses of joint
attention. Neither of the two approaches makes it possible to address the
cognitive instead of the normative question.
3 A cognitive-first approach to joint attention
3.1 Mutual awareness is assumed
In 2003 Michael Tomasello remarked that child language acquisition is not a
logical problem, but an empirical one. He urged that a theory of human lin-
guistic competence should be based less be on analogies to formal languages,
and more on empirical research in the cognitive sciences (2003, 328). Unfor-
tunately, Tomasello himself didn’t fully apply this dictum to the topic of com-
mon knowledge and joint attention, assuming, along with many others, that it
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must involve either something akin to recursive mindreading, or some primit-
ive non-analyzable plural “we” subject, which is in turn presumably produced
by as yet undiscovered unconscious mechanisms (cf. Zawidzki, 2013):
From early on as well, infants communicate with others refer-
entially, inviting them to jointly attend to something, and this
requires recursive inferences about mental states embedded in
mental states. (Tomasello, 2019, 44)
Given the narrow “normative-first” focus of traditional approaches to joint at-
tention, however, I propose that, if we are interested in the cognitive ques-
tion, there are no strong reasons to assume a priori that the key feature of joint
attention is a fully symmetric epistemic or experiential openness. Instead, I
propose that a more fruitful approach to describe the triadic interaction of
joint attention is to concentrate on what factors or aggregate of factors each
individual co-attender is responding to, so that this interaction can be estab-
lished, without presuming in advance the nature of the epistemic or phenom-
enal sophistication they must achieve. In this section, I provide the outline of a
“cognitive-first” approach to assess the jointness of joint attention. The start-
ing point is to leave normative concerns on the side for the time being. The
aim of a cognitive-first approach is not to arrive at a justification for the men-
tal states of an individual during joint attention. We are not (yet) concerned
with the rationality of those mental states.
In a nutshell, I suggest that mutual awareness in joint attention is neither
a primitive nor reductive intersubjective relation that co-attenders must ar-
rive at, but that it is often implicitly assumed, and that we must (un)learn that
other people may not attend to the same things we attend, or may not share
the same perceptual knowledge we are currently enjoying. This view is sup-
ported by research in developmental and cognitive psychology. Two-year-old
children typically assume that an adult interacting with them will share their
perceptual perspectives (Moll & Meltzoff, 2011; Epley et al., 2004). In one par-
ticular experiment, two-year-old children shared visual attention of two ob-
jects with an adult, one by one. The child was then presented with a third
object, which the adult could not see. In one condition, this was because the
adult was present behind a barrier, so that they didn’t have visual access to the
third object but continued to communicate verbally while the child inspected
the object. In another condition, the adult was completely absent from the
room when the third object was shown to the child. The task was to identify
which of the three objects was new for the adult when she explicitly requested
to the child for the “one she has not seen before”. Children were able to cor-
rectly select the new object when the adult had been absent from the room,
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but they were not able to differentiate between new and old objects when the
adult was behind the visual barrier and could not see the object but still en-
gage with them verbally (Moll et al., 2011).
Moll and colleagues interpret these results as showing that physical co-
presence and some form of minimal engagement is enough for children to
assume that they are sharing their perceptual experiences with the adult (see
also Hobson & Hobson, 2011). These findings are in line with, for example, the
everyday experience of a child talking in the telephone and assuming that the
other person is aware of what they are pointing to. The impulse to assume
openness or sharing experiences or knowledge is not restricted to children
alone. A similar phenomenon is observed in adults, where someone’s own
knowledge will affect, however implicitly, their ability to reason about another
person’s beliefs (Epley et al., 2004). Referred to as the “curse of knowledge”,
people are egocentrically biased to assume that others know what they them-
selves know (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Farrar & Ostojić, 2018).
On the view I propose, then, during joint attention co-attenders merely
have to assume, pre-reflectively, that their attention to the same object
is shared with someone else’s. Contrary to the traditional reductive view,
attaining perceptual common knowledge towards the same object is not
cognitively taxing, but curbing it down is: taking into consideration whether
other people do not share your object of attention is cognitively demanding,
at least during development and in novel situations with no prior preced-
ents. Unlike non-reductive views which posit some intersubjective primitive
phenomenon behind joint attention, the view I propose is anchored on
the individual. It concerns the mental processes that an individual A must
go through in order to say that she is jointly attending with B to x (and is
mutually aware with B about so being in joint attention to x). Of course, B
and her mental processes will often come into the picture too. However, in
this analysis, B musn’t necessarily be a minded individual. A can engage in
joint attention with, e.g., a computer avatar or with animals. Whatever B
knows or is aware of is not constitutive of this analysis. This account concerns
the mental and psychological states of A alone, so that we can say that A
takes herself, from her perspective and her practical purposes (though not
necessarily consciously) to be jointly attending with B to x.
This proposal allows us to get a grip on the cognitive question without as
yet being misled by normative concerns. What cognitive capacities and men-
tal processes or understanding are involved in joint attention? What minimal
capacities are necessary to pre-reflectively assume that one is sharing atten-
tion to the same object with others? Based on the studies by Moll and col-
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leagues, we can start with a set of minimal cues that I as a co-attender should
be capable of recognising:
• You are a separate individual from me.
• You are physically present.
• You engage with the world as I do.
Based on these cues, I can form the subpersonal representation that the at-
tention towards x is shared. This cognitive process could be paraphrased as
“I have a certain relation to x, and since you and I are so similar, (I assume)
you have it too.” It becomes clear that the notion of mutual awareness I am
using here is considerably weaker than the notion used by reductive and non-
reductive approaches. When I assume mutual awareness, this does not imply
that this assumption must be fully conscious, reflective or deliberate, or that
I have to consciously entertain the proposition that you are similar to me. It
does not even require having a concept of mutual awareness. The only re-
quirement is that I recognise and respond to the cues that you provide by im-
plicitly assuming that you engage with the object in the same way I engage
to it. Such recognition and response is plausibly supported by subpersonal
sensory-motor and affective processes (cf. Reddy, 2010). Conceptual and re-
flective awareness of this engagement plays no role.4 Of course, I could be-
come reflectively aware of our joint engagement towards x. Usually, this oc-
curs when the assumption of joint attention breaks or misfires. If I say to you
“Grandma made it”, and you show no comprehension of the intended refer-
ent, I can become retroactively conscious that I assumed, incorrectly, that we
were looking at the cake together. When interaction fails, an individual may
learn to tone down their assumptions of openness in similar future interact-
ive situations, and revaluate the set of cues that trigger their assumption of
mutual awareness in those situations.
Uncovering the set of cognitive capacities behind joint attention is an at
root an empirical project, not a purely conceptual one. But conceptual clar-
ity regarding different explanatory aims can assist with this empirical project.
For this reason, while the present proposal is yet underdeveloped as a full re-
sponse to the cognitive question and cannot be the complete story, it serves as
an illustration of a cognitive-first approach to joint attention and its openness.
4In contrast to both Campbell (2005) and (2005), I do not aim to characterise the phenom-
enal experience of openness itself. I remain noncommittal to what the phenomenology of
this assumption might be. However, it is important to note that the functional role of assum-
ing mutual awareness, in the weaker sense used here, can be carried out without invoking its
phenomenological aspect.
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3.2 Epistemic implications
Mutual awareness in joint attention is implicitly assumed. How would this
approach fare in accounting for the epistemic justificatory role that joint at-
tention is taken to play in human social lives? The normative aim is to explain
how joint attention supports joint beliefs and joint actions, and yields shared
knowledge of our environment. The proposed account, I suggest, shifts the
epistemic normative question from explaining how individuals can attain a
relation of mutual awareness in joint attention that justifies shared knowledge
of the perceptual environment, to explaining how individuals abstain from
defaulting to possibly erroneous assumptions of mutual awareness. This ap-
proach concerns the mental and psychological states of each individual alone,
so that all we can say, regarding A, is that A attends to x, and that A takes her-
self to be attending to x together with B. Whether A is actually justified to take
herself to be in a situation of joint attention is a further question, which will
depend on factors external to her psychology. More precisely, it will depend
on what is happening inside the mind of B: A is justified to take herself to be
in a situation of joint attention with B iff B attends to x, and B takes herself to
be attending to x together with A. Conversely, B is justified to take herself to be
in a situation of joint attention with A iff A attends to x, and A takes herself to
be attending to x together with B. We can now spell out a normative epistemic
account of joint attention.
A and B jointly attend to x iff
1. A attends to x.
2. B attends to x.
3. A takes herself to be attending to x together with B.
4. B takes herself to be attending to x together with A.
This account seems at first circular. A critic may point out that conditions (3)
and (4) already presuppose what we are trying to analyse, i.e., the jointness of
joint attention. On the other hand, a primitivist proponent might in turn re-
tort that (3) and (4) should be taken as primitive conditions, which cannot be
further analysed. I disagree with both views. It is important here to recall the
distinction between cognitive and normative aims and explananda. One thing
is to have a psychological state of being in joint attention. A different thing is
to outline the justifications for that state. To aid maintain this distinction, I
suggest differentiating between psychological joint attention and normative
joint attention. The normative notion of joint attention consists of conditions
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(1) - (4). Conditions (3) and (4) themselves, however, refer strictly to the psy-
chological states of A and B, states which need not include any concept, re-
flection or awareness as to the normative force they play when all conditions
(1) - (4) are realised. In other words, the aetiology of these states need not in-
volve the normative notion of joint attention. There is, therefore, no circular-
ity, and there are no primitive unanalysable intersubjective states. Conditions
(3) and (4), as psychological states, can and should be further analysed. The
empirically-based view proposed in the previous section is an attempt, after
all, to sketch the cognitive capacities that go into the psychological state of
pre-reflectively assuming that one is sharing attention to the same object with
someone else.
Returning to the normative question, how are condition (1) - (4) realised?
As noted above, the normative problem for A (as for B, mutatis mutandis) is
not to arrive at the state that she is jointly attending to x with B. The problem
A faces is to avoid defaulting to her prior assumption that she jointly attends
to x with B, when that default should not be made — that is, in cases where B
does not share her attention. The problem A faces is to avoid defaulting to her
prior assumption that (3), when (3) should be rejected. There are two basic
ways in which A’s having a psychological state of assuming shared attention to
x with B is not rationally justified:
i. Both conditions (2) and (4) don’t hold.
ii. Condition (2) holds but (4) doesn’t. B attends to x, but does not have a
psychological state of being attending to x together with A.5
Since A’s psychological state of sharing attention to x with B does not need
to include conditions (2) and (4), its rational justification is external to A’s psy-
chology. Her psychological state can be merely based on the following implicit
reasoning: “I have a certain relation to x, and since you and I are so similar, (I
assume) you have it too.” Nothing requires A to reason any further. If she stops
here, she takes herself to jointly attend to x with B (as a matter of psychology,
that is). She may, of course, be epistemically wrong and unjustified. This is
one possible stage of epistemic failure. Given (i) and (ii), to override default-
ing to assumptions of mutual awareness, however, A will have to estimate the
probability that B does not attend x, and the probability that B’s attention is
not being shared (see Siposova & Carpenter, 2019).
5What about a situation where condition (4) holds but (2) doesn’t? Whether this situ-
ation can ever occur will depend on whether (4) necessarily entails (2), which, in turn, will
depend on the particular theory of perceptual attention endorsed. For example, one could
erroneously assume oneself to be attending to x but be, in fact, attending to y. For simplicity,
however, in this paper I assume that the entailment holds necessarily, so that the situation
where condition (4) holds but (2) fails cannot occur.
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These estimates constitute two further psychological factors that modu-
late the rationality of her assumption of mutual awareness (or her withholding
the assumption). On the proposed hypothesis, estimating these probabilities
is cognitively demanding — though such process can of course (and likely it
does) occur unconsciously and pre-reflectively. Depending on her prior ex-
perience in domains involving objects such as x and people such as B, A may
be more or less sensitive to relevant information for estimating these probab-
ilities. According to her estimates, then, A will reject her assumption of mutual
awareness and conclude that there is no joint attention with B, or A will keep
her assumption. The accuracy of her estimates, however, is a matter of degree,
and cannot put A in a fully justified and rational state of normative joint atten-
tion, since these estimates will never fully encompass, from the psychological
stance of A alone, the truths of conditions (2) and (4). These two conditions are
external to A, and therefore beyond the ken of a strictly psychological stand-
point. Paraphrasing Herbert Clark (1996, 96), a fully rational state of normative
joint attention, consisting of conditions (1) – (4) above, can only be held by an
omniscient being. The rationality of A’s assumption of mutual awareness is,
on this account, a matter of degree.
Does this mean that joint attention’s epistemic justificatory role in our
social lives is in jeopardy? Although the answer will ultimately depend on how
strict we make the notion of epistemic rationality, I do not see compelling
reasons to conclude that it doesn’t. There is no a priori need to assume that
the functional role of joint attention is to provide logically irrefutable grounds
allowing individuals to engage rationally in joint endeavours concerning
the jointly attended object. This assumption not only ignores psychological
plausibility, but it may also leave aside aspects of strategic rationality at play
in joint attentional scenarios (cf. Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). Williams James
already noted that “the logic of belief and knowledge” is too abstract to tackle
many epistemic situations. We cannot simultaneously attempt to believe as
many truths as possible and as few falsehood as possible. According to James,
we need to implicitly or explicitly weight the value of avoiding false positives
against false negatives (James, 1956; cf. Van Fraassen, 2002, 88).
In a football game, for example, if I assume joint attention with an oppon-
ent toward the ball and get it wrong, I may not incur any significant costs,
given my practical interests (and I may never realise I got it wrong). But if I
don’t assume joint attention, and should have (i.e. conditions (1), (2) and (4)
hold, but A still fails to assume joint attention), the consequences could be
drastic. Here, a false negative is more pernicious than a false positive. The
coordinated attack scenario is an extreme case in the opposite direction: if
I assume joint attention and get it wrong, then we both stand to incur high
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costs. But if I don’t assume joint attention, and should have, the costs are neg-
ligible. Here, a false positive is more pernicious than a false negative. It would
seem rational for an agent to be sensitive to the pay-off structure of a par-
ticular situation. A notion of epistemic justification in joint attention based
of strict objective accuracy, consisting of conditions (1) - (4), cannot capture
such strategic aspects. A psychological state of being attending to an object or
event together with another person may thus serve a functional role in action,
without that state itself being necessarily accurate or irrefutably justified.
4 Conclusion
People effortlessly engage with others in activities that require attending to-
gether to some object or event. This ability of coordinated joint attention is
considered to be fundamental to many aspects of human development, cog-
nition, and interaction. It is widely held that joint attention is essentially pub-
lic, or “out in the open”. Going beyond the metaphor of openness, however,
requires a proper account of the mutual awareness that underlies joint atten-
tion. Current accounts, I have argued, fail to distinguish between two distinct
explanatory aims when theorising on the openness of joint attention. One aim
is normative: how should the openness of joint attention be characterized to
account for its epistemic significance? Engagement in joint attention provides
a rational basis for coordinated actions and shared knowledge about the world
and others. A distinct explanatory aim is cognitive: what cognitive capacities
and mental processes or understanding are involved in joint attention? Both
reductive and non-reductive accounts of the openness in joint attention are
primarily concerned with the normative aim, and their tensions arise when
they extend their scope to address the cognitive aim.
Drawing from empirical research in infants and adults, I suggest that the
openness in joint attention is not something that co-attenders must arrive
at, but is implicitly assumed. On this hypothesis, given the right sort of cues,
people will tend to assume, often without any conscious reflection, that they
are attending to some object or event together with someone else. Being able
to entertain this assumption in the first place will require a set of minimal cog-
nitive capacities, including the understanding that the other individual is a
separate, live organism with their own goals, and that they engage with the
world in a similar way to oneself. Ultimately, however, uncovering the set of
cognitive capacities behind joint attention is an empirical project, not a purely
conceptual one. Distinguishing between cognitive- and normative-first ap-
proaches to joint attention allow us to distinguish between two different no-
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tions of the concept. Joint attention as a psychological state requires an ana-
lysis at the level of the mental and psychological processing of the individual.
Joint attention as a normative state — at the level of a “space of reasons”, and
pertaining to justified rational epistemic states of the individuals — will have
to include externalist conditions outside a person’s psychology. On this pro-
posal, an individual cannot ever be fully aware of having rationally justified
joint attention toward a common object with a third party, nor can they ever
be fully aware of all the factors that make their state of joint attention ration-
ally justified (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 19-20). They can, at best, form more
or less accurate estimates of these factors. These estimates may be sufficient
to account for the functional role of joint attention in supporting social be-
haviours and joint actions. If we are interested in providing a psychologic-
ally expedient construct of joint attention (Eilan, 2005; Wilby, 2010; Campbell,
2018), these considerations suggest that the notion of a fully normative state
of openness in joint attention may well be cast aside.
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Abstract
From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attentionwith others towards a
common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role
in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and
coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But are visual
attentional mechanisms sufficient to achieve joint attention, in all cases? Besides cases where visual information is missing, we
show how combining it with other senses can be helpful, and even necessary to certain uses of joint attention. We explain the two
ways in which non-visual cues contribute to joint attention: either as enhancers, when they complement gaze and pointing gestures
in order to coordinate joint attention on visible objects, or as modality pointers, when joint attention needs to be shifted away from
the whole object to one of its properties, say weight or texture. This multisensory approach to joint attention has important
implications for social robotics, clinical diagnostics, pedagogy and theoretical debates on the construction of a shared world.
Keywords Joint attention . Social cognition . Cross-modal attention .Multisensory perception
There is more to joint attention than meets
the eye
Infant and caregiver coordinate their attention on a toy while
learning its name; jazz musicians jointly attend to the music
they play together, and hunters can jointly track the smell or
sounds of prey in the forest. The ability to coordinate our
perception on a shared object of interest comes to most of us
between the ages of 9 and 18 months. In our everyday life, we
continue to rely on this non-verbal skill, otherwise known as
joint attention, to communicate, share experiences, and coor-
dinate with others.
Joint attention has been proposed as one of the essential
ingredients of social skills in humans (Adamson, Bakeman,
Suma, & Robins, 2019; Carpenter, Nagell, Tomasello,
Butterworth, & Moore, 1998; Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack, &
Roessler, 2005; Moore & Dunham, 1995; Seemann, 2011;
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) and, arguably, across other animal
species (Ben Mocha, Mundry, & Pika, 2019; Leavens &
Racine, 2009). In most of these accounts, joint attention is
measured through the capacity to follow gaze and pointing
gestures and coordinate on visible targets (Mundy &
Newell, 2007). But does coordinating on visible objects only
depend on vision? And what happens when we need to coor-
dinate, not on visible targets, but on auditory, tactile, or mul-
tisensory ones?
Uncontroversially, shouting or touching someone’s shoul-
der can be useful to make someone pay attention or orient in
the right direction. The role of auditory or tactile alerting sig-
nals as accessory cues is well established in primate (Liebal,
Waller, Burrows, & Slocombe, 2014) and non-primate (Ben
Mocha et al., 2019; Bro-Jørgensen, 2010; Rowe, 1999) animal
multimodal communication. It is similarly uncontroversial
that non-visual senses often act as a background or mere
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enabling condition for visual attention (for instance, by using
vestibular and proprioceptive cues to determine the spatial
orientation of one’s body in the world, and orient visual
attention accordingly). Existing work in the domain of joint
attention would certainly accept that other sensory modali-
ties are involved or that joint attention occurs in multisen-
sory settings. Highlighting that joint attention is fundamen-
tally a multisensory phenomenon, however, stresses that
non-visual senses are not merely accessories to what could
otherwise be defined as a visual phenomenon. Our goal is to
provide a more systematic representation of how non-visual
sensory resources contribute to joint attention. More specif-
ically, we argue that non-visual senses play two crucial
roles. First, they interact closely with gaze and pointing
gestures to prime or enhance the coordination of visual at-
tention. Non-visual senses can certainly act as distractors,
having a negative impact on joint attention. In most cases,
however, and with the exception of rare clinical or artificial
cases, which we discuss below, other senses are at least
minimally involved in the success of joint attention.
Second, they play a necessary role when it comes to extend-
ing social coordination to non-visual and amodal properties
of objects and events in the world.
Consider what would happen if gaze and pointing were
indeed all there was to the coordination of attention: without
computing information frommultiple senses, either serially or
in conjunction, our referential intentions would run a much
higher risk of remaining ambiguous (see Non-visual senses
enhance visual joint attention). We could not coordinate on
non-visible and more abstract aspects of the world (see Non-
visual senses are necessary to extend joint attention). The
current multisensory account is better than a strictly visual
one when it comes to explaining how joint attention estab-
lishes a socially shared world, where mind-independent ob-
jects can be attended in common (see Theoretical implica-
tions: Sharing more than a visual world). It also has implica-
tions for clinical settings and social robotics which are cur-
rently focused on gaze-following: with our new account, def-
icits in gaze coordination could potentially be compensated
for by non-visual modalities, and social robots could coordi-
nate attention with humans even without fine-grained gaze-
following capacities (see Applications: Multisensory strate-
gies for the clinic, the school and social robotics).
Visual joint attention
When Jerome Bruner and colleagues introduced the term joint
attention to the research on the ontogeny of communication
(Bruner, 1974; Scaife & Bruner, 1975), they referred to in-
fants’ developing capacity to share their experiences about
objects and events with others, and learn word meanings.
Now, the construct is used to explain many aspects of our
social activities: joint attention in infancy predicts future social
competence (Mundy & Sigman, 2015) and emotion regula-
tion, and may reinforce executive functions (Morales, Mundy,
Crowson, Neal, & Delgado, 2005; Swingler, Perry, &
Calkins, 2015). For adults, engaging in joint attention modu-
lates multiple cognitive abilities (Shteynberg, 2015), includ-
ing working memory (Gregory & Jackson, 2017; Kim &
Mundy, 2012), mental spatial rotation (Böckler, Knoblich, &
Sebanz, 2011), and affective appraisals to objects in the envi-
ronment (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, & Tipper, 2006).
Bruner’s pioneering work centered on joint visual attention
(Scaife & Bruner, 1975). By and large, subsequent research
has remained exclusively focused on the visual domain. Gaze
behavior can be easily measured and controlled in laboratory
conditions and is therefore a powerful means to study joint
attention. In arguing for a multisensory approach, we do not
aim to diminish the important role played by gaze cues.
Decades of research on gaze following and gaze alternation
have firmly established their importance in development and
cognition (Flom, Lee, & Muir, 2017; Frischen, Bayliss, &
Tipper, 2007; Schilbach, 2015; Shepherd, 2010), and have
provided a solid basis for the study of joint attention.
Research into the early development of joint attention dis-
tinguishes between responding to joint attention by following
the direction of others’ attention, and initiating joint attention
by directing or leading the attention of others to a third object
or event (Mundy & Newell, 2007). Responding to joint atten-
tion, sometimes considered equivalent to following some-
one’s perceptual cues, is the most studied form of joint atten-
tion (Fig. 1a) (Mundy, 2018; but see, e.g., Bayliss et al., 2013;
Stephenson, Edwards, Howard, & Bayliss 2018). Whether
following social cues for attention differs from following
non-social cues like arrows remains a topic of debate and
investigation, but uncontroversially engages spatial skills
and perceptual gaze processing (Gregory, Hermens, Facey,
& Hodgson, 2016; Hermens, 2017; Langton, Watt, & Bruce,
2000; Mundy, 2018; Shepherd, 2010). Senses other than vi-
sion can play an instrumental role alongside gaze and pointing
gestures to guide spatial attention to visible objects.
Attention following, however, is often not sufficient for
joint attention. For example, I can follow your attention with-
out you noticing in any way that I did so, which would not
count as joint attention. In addition to gaze following, joint
attention requires the ability to engage in a reciprocal
coordination that guarantees we are looking at the same object
together (Mundy, 2018; Siposova & Carpenter, 2019) (Fig.
1b). This triadic coordination exhibits the understanding, even
minimally, that both agents are mutually aiming at or aware of
the object (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Mundy, 2016;
Tomasello, 1995). Non-visual senses here may do more than
facilitate attention following: they help to strategically select
the appropriate target of joint attention between two
individuals.
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Engaging in joint attention requires one to know what one
is attending to, as well as what the other is attending to. This in
turn requires the combined processing of three types of infor-
mation: (1) information about one’s own attentional state, in-
cluding interoceptive and proprioceptive information (Mundy
& Jarrold, 2010); (2) information about the other’s attentional
state; (3) information about the target of joint attention
(Mundy, 2018; Siposova & Carpenter, 2019). All three types
of information and their processing can engage multiple
senses, besides vision. Information about my own attention
to the object of common reference may include whether I
am actively handling the object, or merely looking at it.
Information about the other’s attentional state will vary de-
pending on whether they have access to the same sensory
information I have. The strategies used to establish joint atten-
tion will vary when we coordinate on a smell, a sound, the
color of an object, or a whole, complex multisensory event.
Non-visual senses enhance visual joint
attention
Visual cues provide multisensory expectations
When processing information about the other’s attentional
state, we can further distinguish between the sense I rely on
to monitor the other's attention (e.g., I gaze at your hand
grasping), and the sense they use, which I monitor to gather
information about their attention (e.g., I gaze at your hand
grasping). This distinction already pleads for the incorpora-
tion of richer sensory measures in models of joint attention
than mutual eye contact, gaze following or gaze alternation.
Observing someone’s touching actions, as well as someone
being touched, activates similar neural circuits normally in-
volved in the execution of those actions, and the processing of
actual touch (Buccino et al., 2001; Keysers et al., 2004), sug-
gesting that tactile expectations regarding the jointly attended
object can be gathered vicariously even by sight alone. Studies
have here looked at the use of coupled information from eye
and hand gestures. When reaching and manipulating objects,
gaze and handmovements are systematically coordinated with
respect to the target object, with gaze fixation leading the
subsequent hand movement (Horstmann & Hoffmann, 2005;
Pelz, Hayhoe, & Loeber, 2001). This eye-hand coupling can
provide a path for well-coordinated rapid and successful joint
attentional interaction: although gaze provides a faster cue to
the spatial area where the target is located, the hand trajectory
while reaching and grasping provides a slower but more spa-
tially precise and stable cue to the target’s location (Yu &
Smith, 2013). Additionally, in following a grasping gesture,
observers are sensitive to both the direction and the grip aper-
ture size of the reaching hand to facilitate target detection
(Tschentscher & Fischer, 2008). Reliance on multiple senses
and their interaction may here help provide richer spatial and
temporal representations of our environment (Keetels &
Vroomen, 2012; Stoep, Postma, &Nijboer, 2017). These mul-
tisensory strategies are present during infant–caregiver joint
attentional engagement, which reflects the multisensory na-
ture of parent–infant dyadic communication (Gogate,
Bahrick, & Watson, 2000; Gogate, Bolzani, & Betancourt,
2006; Hyde, Flom, & Porter, 2016). Multimodal behaviors
help sustain joint attention between parents and infants from
12 to 16 months old, in particular when parents express some
interest in an object looking at, talking about, and touching the
jointly attended object (Suarez-Rivera, Smith, & Yu, 2019).
One-year-old infants do not tend to follow the partner’s gaze
to monitor their attention while playing together with a toy.
Instead, they follow their hands (Yu & Smith, 2013). Taken
together, this evidence suggests that non-visual senses and
multisensory expectations are exploited in joint attention, es-
pecially to narrow down the spatial location of the target of
joint attention through spatial redundancy.
Recent research on the emergence of pointing gestures re-
inforces this suggestion. Children interpret pointing gestures
Fig. 1 Following attention is different from coordinating attention. (a)
Attention following is characterized by the unilateral response of one
individual. It can consist of behaviors such as gaze following, or the
monitoring of others’ bodily posture and gestures, and responding to
vocal and haptic cues. Attention following is a pre-condition for full
joint attention, and occurs earlier in development. (b) Coordination of
attention is characterized by the reciprocal interaction between
individuals toward a third object. In addition to gaze following, joint
attention includes gaze-alternation and directing other’s gaze through
pointing — but also other senses
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as if they were attempts to touch things (O’Madagain, Kachel,
& Strickland, 2019), indicating that understanding visual cues
about someone's touch toward a third object are ontogeneti-
cally prior to the understanding referential pointing gestures.
This recent work suggests new methods to explore whether a
similar relation is present in the phylogeny of grasping and
pointing cues.
Non-visual cues enhance visual target detection
Joint attention can be established through gaze alone (Flom
et al., 2017). In many social contexts, the use of visual cues
can be sufficient to coordinate attention, but may not always
be the most efficient. In information theory, adding redundan-
cy to the initial message so that several portions of the mes-
sage carry the same information increases the chance that the
message is accurately received at the end of a noisy channel
(Shannon, 1948). This is also true in perception. For an every-
day illustration, consider trying to hit a nail with a hammer. It
is possible to push the pointy part of the nail in the wall and
then hammer it while relying only on vision, but by holding
the nail with one hand, you can gather information about the
nail’s spatial position both through vision and through your
hand position. Studies in multisensory perception demonstrate
that redundant information delivered across several sensory
modalities increases the reliability of a sensory estimate: it
enhances a perceiver’s accuracy and response time to detect
the presence of a stimulus and to discriminate and identify a
sensory feature (e.g., an object’s shape or its spatial location),
a so-called redundant-signals effect (Ernst & Banks, 2002;
Miller, 1982). It is safe to assume that redundancy of infor-
mation across modalities is also usefully exploited when es-
tablishing and sustaining joint attention. For example, the
caregiver will point to a toy car that the infant can see, and
tap on the toy to make a noise. Here, the combination of the
visual and auditory information enhances the infant’s accura-
cy and speed in shifting spatial attention (cf. Partan & Marler,
1999) (see Fig. 2a). In this section we review how multisen-
sory information facilitates visual coordination and target de-
tection, focusing on three mechanisms: spatial congruency,
temporal synchrony, and cross-modal correspondences.
Redundancy of spatial information is shown to help with
the orienting of visual attention in experiments where individ-
ual perceivers are presented with a task-irrelevant cue on the
same or opposite side of the subsequent visual target.
Participants tend to respond more rapidly, and more correctly,
to visual targets appearing at the same location as the former
task-irrelevant cue, rather than on the opposite side. This
works for visual irrelevant cues (Posner, 1980; see Carrasco,
2011; Wright & Ward, 2008, for overviews) and also occurs
across modalities: participants are faster and more accurate at
detecting target stimuli in one modality when a task-irrelevant
cue is presented in the same or similar location (McDonald,
Teder-Sälejärvi, & Hillyard, 2000; Spence, McDonald, &
Driver 2004a; see Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, &
Woldorff, 2010, for a review). This evidence suggests that
when participants direct their spatial attention to a certain lo-
cation driven by one modality, their sensitivity to stimuli in
that location is also enhanced for other modalities. While these
traditional cross-modal attention studies use nonsocial stimuli,
there is growing evidence of similar effects with social ones.
Gaze-cueing experiments using covert orienting paradigms
have shown that cues from another’s gaze behavior facilitate
the processing of tactile stimuli at the body location corre-
sponding to the other’s gaze direction (Soto-Faraco, Sinnett,
Alsius, & Kingstone, 2005). Recent work shows that gaze-
based cues enhance the processing of tactile (De Jong &
Dijkerman, 2019) and auditory (Nuku & Bekkering, 2010)
stimuli at what is meant to be the jointly attended location.
The current evidence of cross-modal effects in spatial atten-
tion gives us reason to think that a wide array of sensory cues,
besides someone’s gaze or gesture direction, can be exploited
to assist spatial coordination between joint attenders.
Temporal synchrony between cross-modal cues, in the ab-
sence of spatial congruence, also directs someone’s spatial
attention. Van der Burg et al. (2008, 2009, 2010) have shown
that the presentation of a spatially irrelevant cue in the audi-
tory or tactile modality can facilitate a participant’s visual
search performance in an environment with color-changing
elements, when the non-visual cue is presented at the same
time as a color change in the target element. Known as the
“pip-and-pop effect,” these studies show that even when one
sensory cue does not carry relevant spatial information, it can
enhance the salience of a spatially relevant cue in a different
modality (Ngo & Spence 2010). These cross-modal effects
could be exploited in trying to establish joint attention to a
target in a changing, dynamic environment. Touching some-
one's shoulder or vocalizing in synchrony with a certain
movement or event (e.g., every time a particular bird jumps
from a branch or flutters its wings) may be a better strategy to
coordinate attention to it than pointing alone (Fig. 2B).
Finally, the properties of the non-visual social cues can
also shape congruency effects, besides providing spatial or
temporal congruence with visual cues. We are not talking here
of semantic congruence (saying “dog” or “woof” while
pointing at the visible dog) but of sensory congruence be-
tween properties such as pitch or loudness, and visual proper-
ties, such as brightness, shape, etc. Humans, like some other
animals (Bee, Perrill, & Owen, 2000), exploit the environ-
mental regularities that exist between sensory cues across mo-
dalities for communicative purposes. Such regularities show
up in cross-modal correspondences, i.e. robust associations
between independent features or dimensions across modalities
(Spence, 2011; Spence & Deroy, 2013). For example, high-
pitched sounds correspond to high spatial positions of a visual
stimulus, so that when both features are congruently matched,
1129Psychon Bull Rev  (2020) 27:1126–1138
attentional orienting to a target visual cue is facilitated
(Bernstein & Edelstein, 1971). Other cross-modal correspon-
dences, such as the one that exists between pitch and bright-
ness, work together with temporal synchrony to elicit a “pip-
and-pop effect” during visual search: when a visual target
changes brightness, a congruent change in pitch of a task-
irrelevant auditory cue enhances correct target detection
(Klapetek, Ngo, & Spence 2012). The effects of cross-modal
correspondence have so far been mostly studied in nonsocial
domains. We suggest that they are also relevant in social do-
mains. For example, when trying to direct your attention to an
animal hiding in the trees, emitting a high-pitched rather than a
low-pitched interjection might help direct attention to the
higher part of the scene. To test this suggestion, future work
on multisensory joint attention will have to address the role of
cross-modal alerting signals, and how the processing of cross-
modal social signals compares to nonsocial situations.
Importantly, how much spatial, temporal, and cross-modal
congruence facilitate the processing of visual gaze or pointing
gestures is ripe for more precise measurements, notably by
artificially manipulating the discrepancy between the cues,
and measuring the subsequent effects on joint attention.
The interplay between coordinated attention and
multisensory processing
Multisensory cues can help the social coordination of atten-
tion. Surprisingly, the reverse can also be true. A few innova-
tive studies give evidence that coordinating attention with a
partner modulates a participant’s multisensory processing.
People are better able to ignore task-irrelevant stimuli in a
distracting modality when they know that someone else is
attending to these distractors (Heed, Habets, Sebanz, &
Knoblich, 2010; Wahn, Keshava, Sinnett, Kingstone, &
König, 2017).
In the first study (Heed et al., 2010), participants had to
judge whether a tactile stimulus was presented on the upper
or lower part of a cube, while a distractor visual stimulus was
presented synchronously at the same or opposite elevation. In
the individual task, participants responded faster and more
Fig. 2 (Upper panel) Non-visual cues can complement visual cues in
joint attention. (a) Redundant information delivered acrossmodalities can
increase accuracy and speed in following spatial cues: by monitoring
someone’s eye-gaze cues in combination to their hand-grasping actions,
the follower’s response in localizing the object of joint attention is
enhanced. (b) Using temporal congruence between a cue and a target in
different modalities to facilitate someone’s orienting to the correct visual
target. (Lower panel) Non-visual cues are often necessary for joint
attention. (c) Establishing joint attention toward a non-visual target by
using ostensive visual cues: ostensive pointing at the relevant sensory
organ (touching one’s ear or one’s nose) can provide evidence to
another agent of the intention of attending to a non-visual stimulus (a
sound, a smell). Such strategies rely on cognitive abilities to infer that
the target is non-visual. (d) Exploiting temporal synchrony: a parent
shakes an object in a temporally synchronous manner congruent with
their uttering the word “red.” While the visual stimulus and the auditory
stimulus have different causal sources (the toy and the parent), the
information is conveyed that the word “red” is associated with a visual
property of the toy. (e) Coordinating on objects we each experience
through different modalities: each subject must process information
about each other’s modal access relative to the target to successfully
achieve coordination
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accurately when the distractor stimulus was presented at the
same elevation as the tactile target, showing a performance
difference known as the cross-modal congruency effect
(CCE; see Spence, Pavani, Maravita, & Holmes, 2004b, for
a review). Interestingly, the CCE was significantly reduced
when a partner was instructed to attend to the visual stimuli,
indicating that participants could better ignore incongruent
distractors when their partner responded on them. This effect
was recently replicated in an audiovisual congruency task
(Wahn et al., 2017) involving visual flashes and auditory
tones originating from the same or opposite spatial vertical
location. Knowing that someone else was attending to the
incongruent flashes allowed participants to respond faster to
the tones, resulting in a reduced CCE.
These studies show that responding jointly reduces the
interference of competing stimuli in a multisensory setting
(Wahn & König, 2017). The results seem at odds with a
recent tradition of research showing that acting jointly
increases the interference of irrelevant stimuli, presum-
ably due participants co-representing each other’s tasks
besides their own (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003,
2005). For example, performing an object-based visual
attention task jointly impairs performance (Böckler,
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012), and the increase in interfer-
ence of irrelevant information is well documented in Go/
No Go joint Simon tasks (Dolk et al., 2014). The differ-
ence between the reduction and the increase of irrelevant
interference in different joint attentional tasks may be due
to the nature of the tasks studied. An efficient division of
labor can be allowed when the different target stimuli of
each co-actor’s task are presented concurrently, whereas
the beneficial effect of filtering irrelevant information dis-
appears when the task involves two competing Go/No Go
actions (Dolk & Liepelt, 2018; Sellaro, Treccani, &
Cubelli, 2018).
So far, studies have focused on coordinated social at-
tention to separate cross-modal targets. Each participant
attends and responds to a different modal stimulus, which
facilitates a perceptual division of labor. A multisensory
approach to joint attention should encourage us to extend
this work to situations where partners attend and respond
to the same multisensory stimuli, or try and ignore
distractors in the same modality while focusing on anoth-
er one. For example, when two subjects jointly coordinate
their attention toward sounds and flashes presented close-
ly in space and time, the binding of two or more modal
features may be further enhanced, compared to conditions
where subjects attend to the same sounds and flashes
alone. If both are asked to attend jointly to the sounds,
and jointly ignore the flashes, they may also be less prone
to a ventriloquist effect, where the location of the sounds
is displaced toward the location of the flashes (Vroomen
& De Gelder, 2004).
Non-visual senses are necessary to extend
joint attention
Jointly attending to invisible sounds or smells
The dominance of vision in the study of, and theorizing about,
perception and joint attention may reflect the importance of
this modality in humans (Colavita, 1974; Emery, 2000; Itier &
Batty, 2009; Sinnett, Spence, & Soto-Faraco, 2007), but
should not occult the fact that humans also jointly attend and
teach words referring to sounds and smells, not to mention
musical features.
Establishing joint attention toward a non-visual target re-
quires access to information about both the other’s attentional
focus and, crucially, the target where the other’s attention
should be directed. Relative to gaze, a clear limitation of au-
dition and olfaction is that their target of attention is not pub-
licly disclosed to an observer. To establish joint attention co-
ordination on strictly non-visual targets, subjects may be
obliged to indirectly coordinate on the visual location of these
non-visual events and use cognitive strategies to signal and to
infer that the target is non-visual. For example, ostensive
pointing at the relevant sensory organ (touching one’s ear, or
one’s nose) can provide evidence to another agent of the in-
tention of attending to a non-visual stimulus (Baker &Hacker,
2005) (Fig. 2c).
In addition, ostensive strategies could involve negative
cues such as standing still, and keeping one’s head and eyes
motionless to signal that attention should be directed to a non-
visual target of joint attention. Here, one prediction would be
that such cases would occur only after expectations about
pointing and gaze have been fully formed – as the strategy
rests on using a mismatch between the expectation (that eyes
and heads move) and the results (eyes and heads do not move,
meaning that the target is non-visible).
Although visual and gestural ostensive cues may be used
on some occasions to direct attention to a non-visible target,
such behaviors already presuppose that the other agent is ca-
pable of understanding that sounds and smells are objects in
the world that can be perceived together with others. The
developmental onset of the ability to gaze at objects jointly
with others is well researched. One outstanding question is
when infants start to display an equivalent understanding that
others can share with them attention to smells and sounds, and
how this understanding is coupled with processing the visual
attention of others.
Jointly attending to amodal features
Gaze-based joint attention enhances basic object recognition,
even in very young infants (Cleveland & Striano, 2007;
Hoehl, Wahl, Michel, & Striano, 2012; Wahl, Marinović, &
Träuble, 2019). However, object-recognition development
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relies on the ability to perceive global, invariant, and amodal
properties like spatial location, tempo, rhythm, and intensity,
which can only be conveyed through the combination of dif-
ferent sense modalities (Bahrick & Lickliter, 2014; Hyde
et al., 2016). The redundancy introduced by multisensory
events can thus be strategically used to establish joint attention
on amodal features of objects and events. Bahrick and col-
leagues suggest that perception of this amodal information is
critically important for the development and performance of
perceptual object and event recognition (Bahrick, 2010).
One key example of such strategic use is the manner in
which the temporal synchrony (when onset, offset, and/or du-
ration of sensory stimuli are the same) between vision and
audition can be exploited. For instance, a parent will shake
an object in a temporally congruent way with the word they
utter, thus enhancing the associating between object and word
(Fig. 2d) (Gogate et al., 2000; Gogate & Hollich, 2016; Jesse
& Johnson, 2016). The significance of temporal and spatial
synchrony across different sensory cues is not only restricted
to language learning. Running a toy car over the table or over
the infant’s arm while saying “vroom” may not directly lead
towards word acquisition, as there is no linguistic element to
be acquired. But it may help to bind both visual (e.g., shape)
and auditory (e.g., vehicle noises) properties to the same ob-
ject, the toy car.
The use of two cues highlights an important point. Here the
target of joint attention is broader than the cues used to attract
and coordinate attention: making a sound while moving a toy-
car and looking at it ostensibly can be used to draw attention to
the whole multisensory object, including its amodal extension,
its weight, texture, etc., and not just its auditory or visual
properties.
Conversely, the target of joint attention can be narrower
than the object of individual attention and even of mutually
shared experiences. For example, while musicians may attend
to how others move their bow, hands, and heads, their joint
attention is focused on the music they produce or, indeed, an
element of the music (a particular voice or a particular theme).
Moreover, their auditory joint attention will be coordinated
through the gestures of a musical conductor, which provide
visual cues about particular aspects in the sounds that musi-
cians must follow – the music’s tempo, for example. In this
sense, the target of coordinated attention is narrower than the
visual and auditory cues they use to attract and maintain their
attention and narrower than the multisensory production that
they know they are mutually experiencing.
Taking into account the role of non-visual senses in coor-
dinating attention highlights that the target of joint attention
can often be different than the target of each individual’s
attention. Joint attention involves more than merely orienting
toward the same target. Perceptual attention can be character-
ized as the selective information processing of a specific area
or features of the sensory world, while ignoring or decreasing
processing of other areas and features (Eriksen & James,
1986; Klein & Lawrence, 2012). Joint attention results in a
socially mediated enhancement in the processing of sensory
information (Mundy, 2018). In other words, joint attention
brings about another level of selectivity over an individual’s
own perceptual attention. Engaging in joint attention allows us
to extract from a fundamentally multisensory experience the
relevant integrated targets or specific features (visual, audito-
ry, etc.) for further information processing and social
coordination.
Sensory deficits: Jointly attending to a multisensory
object through different senses
What happens when coordination occurs on objects that the
two agents experience through different modalities? This is
the case when coordinating attention with blind individuals,
or individuals whose vision is temporarily blocked (say, they
wear opaque glasses). Here, both or at least one agent knows
that the other cannot access the object on which attention
needs to be coordinated via the visual modality that they them-
selves use to access the object.
Cases of sensory deprivation (e.g., deafness, blindness, an-
osmia, hyposmia) provide methodological tools to study the
roles of different senses during joint attention, and how indi-
viduals with limited sensory access negotiate coordination.
Atypical development highlights the manner in which we
share attention with others as a function of information access.
In a case study of two congenital blind infants, coordinating
attention with their caregivers involved auditory information
as well as tactile and kinesthetic information, memory, sound
changes, air currents, and echolocation (Bigelow, 2003).
Deaf-blind children tend to combine two or more sensory
sources for coordinating attention toward an object with their
non-deaf-blind parents (Núñez, 2014). A 3-year-old child with
profound visual and hearing impairment would first draw on
touch to check that she has her caregiver’s attention. She
would then hold the object of interest towards the caregiver’s
face with one hand while continuing to monitor their attention
with the other hand, vocalizing excitedly and smiling through-
out (Núñez, 2014). Social gaze behavior and joint attention
through vision alone can also be impacted by auditory deficits
(e.g., Corina & Singleton, 2009; Lieberman, Hatrak, &
Mayberry, 2014). There is evidence, for example, that audito-
ry deprivation affects the effect of gaze cues and gaze follow-
ing. Deaf children (aged between 7 and 14 years old) are more
susceptible to the influence of task-irrelevant gaze cues than
hearing children (Pavani, Venturini, Baruffaldi, Caselli, & van
Zoest, 2019). This effect appears to dissipate in deaf adults,
suggesting that the salience of social gaze cues changes during
development (Heimler et al., 2015)
These studies reinforce the view that our ability to establish
the triadic relation characteristic of joint attention can vary
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according to the modal pathways used for directing and fol-
lowing the other’s attention (Fig. 2e). In multisensory con-
texts, agents can share across information to which the other
person has no access, or is not actively accessing. To illustrate,
suppose we are jointly attending to a coffee cup by vision. In
addition, I am also touching the object to judge its tempera-
ture. Through our coordinated attention to the cup and by
monitoringmy responses, you can vicariously gather informa-
tion on my haptic experience and whether the cup is warm.
Theoretical implications: Sharing more than
a visual world
Philosophers and psychologists have taken the role of joint atten-
tion in our understanding of other minds to argue that joint at-
tention is, in fact, essential to understand the concept of a shared
objective world, where mind-independent objects are attended in
common (Davidson, 1999; Eilan, 2005; Engelland, 2014;
Seemann, 2019; Tomasello, 2014). The ability to coordinate at-
tention to an object together with another individual goes hand in
hand with the ability to experience the object as a mind-
independent entity separate from oneself (Campbell, 2011).
This view has pre-eminent precursors in psychology. Lev
Vygotsky (2012), in particular, held the doctrine that all higher
cognition in an individual arises from an internationalization pro-
cess of prior social interactions. Vygotsky’s original formulation
may seem overly strong, but a Vygotskyan approach has become
increasingly influential to account for the social influences ob-
served in the development of cognition and psychiatric disorders
(Bolis & Schilbach, 2018; Fernyhough, 2008; Hobson &
Hobson, 2011; Tomasello, 2019). Granting that joint attention
helps us build a shared objective world, restricting ourselves to
gaze and vision alone would make this world incredibly
impoverished.
To stress this point, imagine a case where joint attention
would only occur through gaze-following and looking at
pointing gestures: we would only be able to coordinate atten-
tion on the visual properties of objects and events. We would
certainly be able to learn that most bananas are yellow; we
would learn that using color-tinged glasses changes how these
properties look; and we would learn that other people may be
seeing a drawing upside down when we see it right side up.
But how would two people jointly attend to the sound of
thunder, or the smell of natural gas?Would they quickly make
the difference between pointing at the color of the car, or the
car as a whole?
Realizing that we attend to a unitary object or to specific
properties cannot occur in a visual-only scenario, or certainly
without resorting to more conventional or linguistic means.
Using a multisensory combination of cues is necessary to
explain that we share an objective world of multisensory ob-
jects, sounds, smells, and textures.
Applications: Multisensory strategies
for the clinic, the school, and social robotics
A better understanding of the mechanisms through which
multisensory and cross-modal processes help and shape the
successful coordination of attention on the same object, or on
a given aspect of an object, can have direct implications for
several sectors and fields.
When gaze coordination is limited
In a caregiver-child pair in which one person has a
sensory deficit (deaf-blind, deaf, blind), the information
that can be shared will be limited in some way, and
compensated for in others. Tactile joint attention is cru-
cial for children with visual impairments and multiple
sensory disabilities (Chen & Downing, 2006). A child
rolling Play-Doh will lead the adult’s hand to share
attention to her activity. The adult can follow the
child’s lead and focus on what the child is doing by
keeping non-controlling tactile contact both with the
child’s hands and with the Play-Doh, establishing a re-
ciprocal relation.
An emphasis on gaze interaction, however, can lead to
biased assessments of an individual’s ability to coordinate
and interact with others. When measured according to
vision-based operationalizations, deaf children of hearing
parents show a delay in the onset of visual joint attentional
skills, and symbol-infused joint attention (involving words or
symbolic gestures) tends to be less frequent than in typically
developing infants (Prezbindowski, Adamson, & Lederberg,
1998). These results have been challenged when factoring
the role of other senses: hearing parents do accommodate
their deaf children’s hearing status by engaging them via
multiple modalities, while parents of typically developing
children tend to use alternating unimodal (either visual or
auditory) cues during a joint attention episode (Depowski,
Abaya, Oghalai, & Bortfeld, 2015). Developmental differ-
ences are not pronounced in deaf children of deaf parents,
who tend to coordinate attention using both visual and tactile
signals (Spencer, 2000).
Taken together, these findings suggest that operationalizations
of joint attention based on gaze alone may produce unreliable
measures of the real ability of infants to coordinate attention with
others. They also show that non-visual senses impinge on the
development of joint attention, even for non-visually impaired
deaf individuals. Finally, the ability to engage in joint attention
depends not just on the atypical infant’s behavior, but, important-
ly, on that of their caregivers. Adopting a multisensory perspec-
tive on joint attention can provide better measures of the devel-
opment of atypical children and inspire new complementary
strategies to foster the development of joint attention skills.
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Multisensory joint attention during learning
The ostensive character of joint attention is central to the acqui-
sition of language (Adamson et al., 2019; Carpenter et al., 1998;
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) and, more generally to the transmis-
sion of knowledge and learning (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). In
traditional paradigms on the role of joint attention in language
development, triadic coordination to a target object is visually
established through gaze alternation or pointing, accompanied by
the utterance of the linguistic label to be associated with the
object (see Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2007, for a critical
overview). As noted above, however, early linguistic develop-
ment is increasingly recognized as a multisensory process
(Gogate & Hollich, 2016; Jesse & Johnson, 2016). Similarly,
the importance of multisensory teaching methods is increasingly
recognized within pedagogy, both for typically developing chil-
dren (e.g., Kirkham, Rea, Osborne, White, & Mareschal, 2019;
Shams & Seitz, 2008; Volpe & Gori 2019) and for children with
learning differences, including dyslexia (e.g., Birsh, 2005) and
autistic spectrum disorder (e.g., Mason, Goldstein, & Schwade,
2019).
A better understanding of the interplay of different sense
modalities during joint attention, across different ages and
neurological conditions, can support the development of mul-
tisensory protocols in pedagogical situations. It should also be
a reminder of cross-cultural differences when generalizing
about teaching: in some cultures, touch, sounds, or smells
are more central to social engagement, learning, or communi-
cation (Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2008; Kinard & Watson,
2015). Akhtar and Gernsbacher (2008) review evidence sug-
gesting that in cultures where infants experience continuous
physical or vocal contact with their caregivers, and spend less
time in face-to-face eye contact, evidence of social engage-
ment will rely on tactile, auditory, and olfactory cues more
than mutual gaze cues. Mothers in Kenya, for example, en-
gage in more touching and holding with their infants, and less
in eye contact, than mothers in the USA (Richman, Miller, &
LeVine, 1992).
Multisensory joint attention with artificial social
agents
The field of social robotics strives to bring artificial agents into
hospitals, schools, businesses, and homes – complex social
environments that require the enactment of naturalistic non-
verbal interactions, including joint attention coordination
(Clabaugh & Matarić, 2018; Kaplan & Hafner, 2006; Yang
et al., 2018). For a robot to help a human partner assemble a
piece of furniture, stack blocks with children in the play-
ground, and assist people with disabilities in their daily lives,
they need to be sensitive to what the human is attending to,
and asking them to attend to.
Whether an artificial agent can successfully engage in joint
attention with humans will depend on how well they can meet
the behavioral expectations of their human interaction partner.
Will they be able to both initiate and follow attentional cues in
a naturalistic manner (Pfeiffer-Leßmann, Pfeiffer, &
Wachsmuth, 2012)? One current approach is to enable social
robots to mimic human gaze behaviors (Admoni &
Scassellati, 2017; Kompatsiari, Ciardo, Tikhanoff, Metta, &
Wykowska, 2019). However, while human participants do
respond to the gaze of artificial agents (Willemse, Marchesi,
& Wykowska, 2018), they are also highly sensitive to mo-
mentary multimodal behaviors produced by their artificial
partner (Yu, Schermerhorn, & Scheutz, 2012). By adopting
a multisensory perspective on human-robot joint attention, it
is possible to examine non-visual cues emitted by the artificial
agent, so that they accord with the expectations of human
interaction partners. Being sensitive to the non-visual cues
emitted by humans could also improve the spatial and tempo-
ral resolution of attention-orienting in robots.
Conclusion
Any episode of visual attention will, de facto, rely on back-
ground multisensory processing: we rely on proprioceptive
and vestibular cues to visually orient our attention and our-
selves in the world.Multisensory interactions, however, play a
more substantial role in the coordination of attention across
social agents: infants and adults recruit multiple sense modal-
ities to initiate and follow someone’s attention to a specific
object or location in space. These interactions can be distin-
guished depending on whether they facilitate the coordination
of visual attention, or whether they extend the coordination to
non-visual and amodal properties. While non-visual modali-
ties are useful complements for vision in the former case, they
are essential in the latter case: some kinds of joint attention are
necessarily multisensory, and could not be carried by vision
alone.
This multisensory approach has implications for behavioral
and developmental models of joint attention. Just as selective
attention can be described as a cognitive capacity that both
influences and is influenced by perceptual processes across
different modalities, models of joint attention must be flexible
enough to incorporate how it relies on dynamic information
frommultiple senses. It also has practical implications to over-
come clinical deficits in joint attention, augment its pedagog-
ical role, and address the challenge of coordinating attention
between humans and social robots.
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Humans continuously coordinate where they focus their attention in the environment with 
others. In many cases, as when listening to a concert, or hunting together, they also need to 
select and integrate information from different senses, or ignore one modality to focus on a 
task-relevant one. Here we examine how joint attention modulates multisensory integration. 
In this preregistered study, we test whether the prevalent hypothesis that joint attention 
enhances stimulus information encoding and processing, over and above individual attention, 
extends to temporal multisensory integration. We used the sound-induced flash illusions, 
where an incongruent number of visual flashes and auditory beeps induces a single flash to be 
seen as two (fission illusion), and two flashes as one (fusion illusion). By asking participants 
to count flashes either alone or together, we expected that enhanced processing of the visual 
target relative to the distracting accompanying sounds would lead to a decrease of both 
fission and fusion illusions when the targets were jointly attended. We found that joint 
attention did not affect the overall frequency of illusions, but decreased participants’ criterion 
bias in the fusion illusion. Our results reveal the limitations of the theory that joint attention 
results in greater processing resources as it does not extend to temporal audiovisual 
integration. 










The Impact of Joint Attention on the Sound-Induced Flash Illusions 
1. Introduction 
People devote greater cognitive resources to those features in their environment that are 
co-attended simultaneously with others (Becchio, Bertone, & Castiello, 2008; Shteynberg, 
2015, 2018). Known as joint attention, coordinating attention with others on a common 
target, even in the absence of communication, enhances a participant’s mental spatial rotation 
performance (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011), and facilitates information encoding in 
working memory (Gregory & Jackson, 2017; Kim & Mundy, 2012). The prevalent theoretical 
hypothesis regarding the functional role of joint attention is therefore that it deepens or 
enhances the encoding of stimulus information in ways that are not observed when 
information is individually attended (Mundy, 2016, 2018; see also Becchio et al., 2008; 
Shteynberg, 2015). This hypothesis explains why joint attention plays a fundamental role in 
language acquisition, the development of theory of mind, and the ability to engage in more 
complex activities with others (Bottema-Beutel, 2016; Carpenter, Nagell, Tomasello, 
Butterworth, & Moore, 1998; Mundy & Newell, 2007). 
The hypothesis of an ‘encoding enhancement’ also accords with findings on the 
influence of gaze-based joint attention on perceptual judgements. Gaze-cueing studies using 
covert orienting paradigms show that another’s gaze behaviour can influence detection and 
discrimination of visual stimuli (see Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007 for a review). For 
example, when the subject’s and an avatar’s spatial visual attention is in conflict, response 
times to judge the number of stimuli presented are slower (Samson et al., 2010). While most 
studies use response times as their primary dependent measure, Seow & Fleming (2019) 
report that participants’ perceptual sensitivity (d’) for detecting Gabor patches increased 
when it was co-witnessed with a bystander agent with a congruent perspective.  




In everyday situations, however, many joint attention scenarios also involve 
multisensory targets of attention, where information from different senses has either to be 
selected and integrated or, on the contrary, separated (Battich, Fairhurst, & Deroy, 2020). 
Previous work addressing the multisensory aspects of joint attention in adults has focused 
predominantly on spatial judgments. Using computer avatar’s eye-gaze cues, Soto-Faraco, 
Sinnett, Alsius, & Kingstone (2005) have shown that both detection and discrimination of 
tactile stimuli at the body location congruent with the other’s gaze direction is facilitated over 
the incongruent body location. Extending these results, Nuku & Bekkering (2010) show that 
task-irrelevant directional gaze cues from a virtual partner influence perceptual judgement 
also in the auditory modality, such that processing stimuli at the jointly attended location is 
facilitated. 
Taken together, these findings accord with the hypothesis that joint attention results in a 
socially-mediated enhancement of the relative encoding and processing of co-attended 
sensory stimuli, compared to solo attention (Mundy, 2016; 2018). The precise extent of this 
hypothesis for multisensory processing remains largely untested. In this study, we examine 
whether this hypothesis extends to temporal multisensory processing. Specifically, we 
examined whether jointly attending to the visual component of multisensory events would 
also result in enhancing its processing, or would reduce the weight of jointly presented, but 
not jointly attended sounds. Though target enhancement and reduction of distractors are often 
considered two sides of the same coin, mechanistic differences provide reasons to regard 
them as possibly distinct phenomena (Chelazzi, Marini, Pascucci, & Turatto, 2019; Noonan 
et al., 2016; van Moorselaar & Slagter, 2020). 
Joint attention is often operationalized in terms of visually perceiving where another 
person (or an avatar) is gazing. Tracking where someone is attending is nonetheless neither 
necessary nor sufficient for joint attention, which involves representing that the two co-




attenders attend to the same perceptual target (Carpenter et al., 1998; Mundy, 2018; Siposova 
& Carpenter, 2019; Tomasello, 1995). It is possible, for instance, that one monitors someone 
else’s gaze without them noticing, which is then not a case of joint attention. It is also 
possible that joint attention occurs when both agents realize that they are attending to the 
same object, even though they are not closely monitoring each other’s gaze. In other words, 
joint attention has more to do with the representation of a “social locus of attention” than 
with gaze-following, even in the absence of verbal communication. To extend previous 
research based on artificial avatars’ shared gaze, it is necessary to investigate how this shared 
locus of attention between two people affects the processing of multisensory information. In 
the present study, we operationalize joint attention as the situation in which two individuals 
focus their perceptual attention on the same modal target, and both know that they are 
attending the same target. 
Relatedly, previous studies have shown that multisensory processing in visuotactile 
(Heed, Habets, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010) and audiovisual (Wahn, Keshava, Sinnett, 
Kingstone, & König, 2017) spatial interference tasks is affected by a division of labour 
manipulation. In these spatial tasks, stimuli in different sensory modalities were 
simultaneously presented either in congruent or incongruent locations. For incongruent 
presentations, visual stimuli tended to distract/interfere with tactile and auditory localisation 
judgements as humans generally tend to rely more on visual information for spatial tasks. In a 
collective condition, each participant in a pair had to attend and respond to a target stimulus 
in different modalities, while ignoring the other modality. That is, one person would be 
tasked to locate auditory stimuli (Wahn et al., 2017) or tactile stimuli (Heed et al., 2010) 
while the other person would be tasked to locate visual stimuli. When participants performed 
their respective tasks together, participants performing the tactile (Heed et al., 2010) and 




auditory (Wahn et al., 2017) localisation task were better able to ignore the visual distractor 
stimuli compared to a condition when they performed the same task on their own. 
A recent study extended this division of attentional labour to the sound-induced flash 
illusion task (Wahn, Rohe, Gearhart, Kingstone, & Sinnett, 2020), which has two variants: 
fission, where a single flash accompanied by two auditory beeps induces a visual percept of 
the flashes, and fusion, where two flashes are perceived as one when accompanied by one 
beep (Andersen, Tiippana, & Sams, 2004; Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000). The rationale 
behind the illusions is that the auditory signal dominates over the visual signal in tasks 
requiring temporal precision, altering the integrated percept (Andersen et al., 2004; Shams, 
Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2002). 
As for the studies mentioned above (Heed et al., 2008; Wahn et al., 2017), tasks were 
divided along sensory modalities. That is, one participant was asked to count the number of 
flashes presented, while a confederate was required to count the number of beeps. When 
these tasks were performed together, participants perceived the sound-induced fission illusion 
significantly more often compared to performing the flash counting task alone. However, this 
effect was no longer found when a divider was placed between the participant and 
confederate, suggesting that visual access is critical. Taken together with the studies 
mentioned above (Heed et al., 2010; Wahn et al., 2017) where participants were better able to 
ignore distracting visual stimuli, the authors suggest that the presence of another person may 
act as a visual distractor such that visual information (presented on the computer screen) is 
attended to a lesser extent. Depending on the performed task, this can either lead to less 
distraction by visual distractors when participants performed an auditory or tactile 
localisation task (Heed et al., 2010; Wahn et al., 2017) or more distraction by auditory stimuli 
when participants performed a visual flash counting task (Wahn et al., 2020), leading to an 
increase in the perceived fission illusions. There is no previous indication, to our knowledge, 




of whether a similar or opposite effect would be observed in a joint attention manipulation, 
where both participants in a pair are required to attend and respond to the same modal target. 
Here, we address whether the hypothesis that joint attention can boost relative 
processing of sensory of co-attended stimuli (by facilitating the processing of the jointly 
attended modality and/or reducing the distraction to the non-attended modality) compared to 
solo attention applies to temporal multisensory processing. In this preregistered study 
(preregistration available at https://osf.io/v5gjp), we investigate this question using the 
sound-induced flash illusions. Not only does this make the comparison with the division of 
attentional labour possible, but sound-induced flash illusions are also reliable indicators of 
the multisensory integration of temporally aligned stimuli (Keil, 2020; Hirst et al., 2020). 
What is more, the fact that the illusion is based on time, rather than space, avoids colluding 
attention to a given modality and attention to a distinct region of space. 
While the specific interactions between attention and multisensory processes are a 
matter of ongoing debate, mounting evidence suggests that multisensory integration can be 
modulated by attentional control (for reviews, see, Choi, Lee, & Lee, 2018; Macaluso et al., 
2016; Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, & Woldorff, 2010). Several studies report possible 
cognitive influences on the sound-induced flash illusions (for reviews see Keil, 2020; Hirst et 
al. 2020), yet earlier studies only investigated manipulations of the individual’s attentional 
focus. For instance, Andersen et al. (2004) found that the integration of audiovisual 
information during both fission (one flash seen as two) and fusion (two flashes seen as one) 
illusions was not automatic but varied depending on whether participants were asked to count 
beeps or flashes. They thus suggest that the illusions are susceptible to differences in 
attentional control, an interpretation supported by findings that the fission illusion is 
modulated by selective spatial attention (Mishra, Martínez, & Hillyard, 2010; Odegaard, 
Wozny, & Shams, 2016). The fission illusion is also modulated by cognitive load (Michail & 




Keil, 2018) and top-down expectations about the proportion of illusion-inducing trials (Wang 
et al., 2019). 
The present study aims to extend our understanding of how attentional and social 
factors affect the fusion and fission illusions by using a joint attention manipulation. As 
current functional models of joint attention suggest that sharing the locus of attention with 
another person will enhance information processing in ways that solo attention does not 
(Mundy, 2018; Battich et al. 2020), it is important to investigate to what extent a joint 
attention manipulation may affect multisensory processing. Investigating such manipulation 
is relevant not only for experimenters as they may need to reconsider the possible effects of 
being within a participant’s view while testing the sound-induced flash illusions (Hirst et al., 
2020), but also for daily life as we often perceive multisensory stimuli in social situations. If 
engaging in joint attention enhances processing of a jointly attended visual target (Becchio et 
al., 2008; Mundy, 2016, 2018; Shteynberg, 2015, 2018), we predict a shift in the relative 
weighting of visual and auditory information, so that the strength of the sound-induced 
illusions will be reduced during joint attention compared to performing the task alone. In 
accordance with maximum-likelihood-estimation (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004) and Bayesian 
inference (Shams & Kim, 2010) frameworks, this shift in audio-visual integration could 
either lead to a boost in processing of the visual target and/or reduce processing of the 
auditory distractor (van Moorselaar & Slagter, 2020). As a control condition, we also expect 
that the mere co-presence of another person who is not engaged in joint attention with the 
participant, will not affect the illusions compared to individual performance. 
Finally, we had no specific predictions regarding possible differences between fission 
and fusion illusions. Known neural (Mishra, Martinez, & Hillyard, 2008) and behavioural 
differences between the two illusion variants suggest that we should not treat them as 
necessarily identical. Neuroimaging studies show that the fission illusion correlates with 




activity modulation in early visual cortical areas and superior colliculus, suggesting that the 
illusion underlies a multisensory process involving early perceptual stages (Cecere, Rees, & 
Romei, 2015; Shams, Iwaki, Chawla, & Bhattacharya, 2005; Watkins, Shams, Tanaka, 
Haynes, & Rees, 2006; Zhang & Chen, 2006). The fusion illusion correlates with activity in 
retinotopic primary visual cortex and the superior temporal sulcus (Watkins, Shams, Josephs, 
& Rees, 2007), a brain region associated with multisensory integration (Beauchamp, Argall, 
Bodurka, Duyn, & Martin, 2004). Susceptibility to the fission illusion, but not the fusion 
illusion, varies with age (DeLoss & Andersen, 2015; McGovern, Roudaia, Stapleton, 
McGinnity, & Newell, 2014) and with emotionally-charged stimuli (Takeshima, 2020). 
Importantly, there is preliminary evidence that cognitive expectations (Wang et al., 2019) 
decrease the occurrence of fission but not fusion illusions. Given these potential differences 
in the mechanisms underlying the fission and fusion illusions, our study will test the 
influence of joint attention for both illusions. 
2. Material and methods 
2.1. Participants 
Given current literature on possible social effects on the sound-induced flash illusion, 
our estimate of a Cohen’s d effect size is of around 0.41 (Wahn et al., 2020). We used the 
software G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to conduct a power analysis, to 
obtain .80 power to detect Cohen’s d effect size of 0.415 for a two-tailed paired t-test, at the 
standard .05 alpha error probability. Based on this, our target sample size was forty-eight 
participants. Due to the possibility of some participants not meeting the inclusion criteria, we 
recruited fifty-two volunteers (29 female, 1 undisclosed gender, M = 27.96 years, SD = 5.9 
years) to participate in the study. Participants received either 9 EUR or course credits as 
compensation for their participation, at their choice. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and hearing, and were right-handed, with mean handedness score M = 




95.26, SD = 15.18, as measured by the shortened Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 
1971; Veale, 2014). 
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved 
by the ethics committee of the University of London (approval ref. SASREC_1819_313A). 
All participants gave written informed consent before their participation. 
2.2. Materials 
Pairs of participants sat next to each other in front of the same computer screen, (model 
Asus VG248QE 24 inches, of 1920 x 1080 pixels resolution, and 60 Hz refresh rate), and at a 
fixed viewing distance (60 cm) from the screen. Their heads were aligned to the outer edges 
of the screen (width 53 cm), so that when looking straight ahead they see the screen outer 
edge. Two speakers (model Logitech Z200) were set adjacent to each side of the screen so 
that the speaker’s middle was levelled with the lower edge of the screen. 
A fixation cross was presented for an interval that varied randomly between 1000-1400 
ms, followed by the visual and auditory stimuli. The visual stimulus consisted of a uniform 
white disc (radius of 2° of visual field, positioned 5° below the fixation cross), flashed for 17 
ms, on a black computer screen. The auditory stimulus consisted of a sine-wave beep of 7 ms 
duration with 3.5 kHz frequency. Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) for consecutive stimuli 
was 57 ms for sound beeps, and 67 ms for visual flashes. The first beep was presented always 
23 ms prior to the first flash (Figure 1). 





Figure 1. (A) Single trial procedure and (B) temporal order of stimuli (when two flashes and 
two beeps are presented). 
2.3. Procedure 
In each trial, either 1 or 2 flashes were presented, accompanied by either 1 or 2 beeps, 
giving 4 types of trials (1F1B, 1F2B, 2F1B, 2F2B). Each of the 4 types of trials was 
presented 30 times. The 120 trials were fully randomized and presented in 4 blocks with 
approx. 10 seconds rest between blocks. Participants were asked to judge how many visual 
flashes they saw, by clicking the left or right buttons of a computer mouse allocated to each 
participant, to report one or two flashes, respectively. Both participants were given the same 
instructions simultaneously and knew that they were performing the same task. 
Participants performed the full set of 120 trials three times, one per social condition: 
individually, jointly, and during a co-presence control. In the individual condition, 
participants sat alone to perform the task, in the same seat that they occupy during the joint 
attention and co-presence control conditions (i.e., a given participant always had the same 
seat); the second participant waited in a separate testing room. During the joint attention 
condition, both participants were instructed to attend to the visual stimuli and perform the 
task concurrently. Each participant still provided their answer individually. In the co-presence 
control condition, participants sat side by side as in the joint attention condition but oriented 
in opposite directions. One participant performed the flash-counting task, while the second 




participant performed an unrelated drawing task on paper. Then participants switched roles. 
During the 120 trials of each condition, the experimenter waited outside the testing room, out 
of sight from both participants. Participants were instructed to avoid talking to each other 
during the flash-counting task. Due to the fast duration of each trial and the demanding nature 
of the flash-counting task, verbal communication is also very difficult to achieve. After 120 
trials were completed, participants saw a text on the screen requesting that the experimenter 
should be contacted. The experimenter then made the necessary setup adjustment depending 
on the next social condition, instructing each participant on their assigned role (e.g. to 
perform the flash-counting task, wait in an adjacent room, or perform an unrelated drawing 
task). The order of social conditions was counterbalanced across participants. In most cases, 
the session took approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was programmed using Python 
(version 3.6.8) and the PsychoPy library (version 3.2.3; Peirce, 2007; Peirce et al., 2019). 
2.4. Data analysis plan 
To analyze the effect of shared attention on the strength of the illusions, we 
preregistered to conduct a 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA for the mean responses with beeps 
(1, 2 beeps) and social condition (individual, joint attention, control) as within-subject 
factors, separately for the fission (1 flash trials) and fusion (2 flashes trials) illusions. 
We also pre-registered and planned two paired t-test comparisons over the interaction 
effects between beeps and social conditions on the number of flashes perceived. First, to test 
whether joint attention reduced the illusions, we contrasted the effect of beeps on the number 
of flashes reported across the individual and joint attention condition. Second, to test whether 
the mere presence of another participant affects the frequency of the illusions, we contrasted 
the effect of beeps on the number of flashes reported across the individual and control 
condition. We performed these planned comparisons regardless of whether the omnibus 
interaction was significant (Abelson & Prentice, 1997; Schad et al. 2020). 




Since the assumption of normality in the parametric models for the number of flashes 
perceived (ANOVAs and t-tests) was violated (Shapiro-Wilk tests performed on the data 
were significant, all ps < .001), we conducted permutation-based ANOVAs separately for 
each illusion (1 flash and 2 flashes trials). We then performed the two planned pairwise 
comparisons with permutation-based t-tests, for each illusion. Though all comparisons were 
planned, we report p-values corrected using the Bonferroni correction. 
We excluded three participants from the sample due to low performance (greater than 
or equal to 35% incorrect responses) on either or both of congruent trials combinations (equal 
number of flashes and beeps presented), aggregated across social conditions, probably due to 
lack of motivation or task compliance. Only single trials with reaction times between 100 ms 
and 3000 ms were included in the analyses. We thus excluded 0.5% of trials (92 trials) spread 
over 24 participants from further analyses. 
To follow upon performance analyses, we preregistered to conduct exploratory 
analyses on any possible effects over reaction times across the different experimental 
manipulations. To examine performance measures that better account for possible 
dissociations in sensitivity and criterion biases, we also preregistered to analyze possible 
effects on signal detection measures in the ability to discriminate between one and two 
flashes, during two-beep trials (coded as Fission), and one-beep trials (coded as Fusion). 
Witt and colleagues (Witt, Taylor, Sugovic, & Wixted, 2015, 2016) suggest that the 
SIFIs should be reflected primarily in the criterion measure as indicative of perceptual 
processes. Theoretically, the number of beeps biases visual perception to detect the same 
number of flashes, rather than making visual perception less sensitive per se. Knotts & Shams 
(2016) suggest that both d’ and c may reflect perceptual aspects associated with the illusion. 
An analysis of sensitivity and criterion can therefore provide nuanced measures for testing 
the impact of social conditions on the illusions. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret 




the criterion bias as a decision bias, response-based bias, or a memory bias. Witt et al. (2015; 
2016) show that the sound-induced flash illusions are predominantly manifested in the 
criterion measure c, but we are not able to distinguish by SDT techniques alone if this bias is 
perceptual or decisional. Apart from taking into account these considerations for the 
interpretation of our results, we also adopt Witt and colleagues’ suggestion to compare one-
beep versus two-beeps trials (Witt et al., 2016), as we are primarily interested in differences 
in multisensory processing between social conditions. The single flash stimulus was treated 
as the target, so that a correct response of one flash when one flash was presented was 
counted as a hit, and an incorrect response of one flash when two flashes were presented was 
counted as a false alarm. Sensitivity was defined as 𝑑′ = 𝑧(𝐻) − 𝑧(𝐹𝐴), and criterion bias 
was defined as 𝑐 = −.5(𝑧(𝐻) + 𝑧(𝐹𝐴)), where 𝑧 is the inverse of the cumulative normal. 
Hit and false alarm rates of 0 and 1 were corrected to (2𝑁)!" and 1 − (2𝑁)!", 
respectively, where 𝑁 is the number of trials on which the rate is based (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). 
For each illusion, we performed one-way repeated measures ANOVAs of d’ and c, 
dependent on social condition as a within-subject factor. As in our performance analysis, we 
then conducted two planned pairwise comparisons (individual vs. joint attention, and 
individual vs. control), reported with Bonferroni corrected p-values. 





3.1. Fission illusion 
 
Figure 2. Fission illusion results. (A) Mean number of flashes reported and (B) mean reaction 
times in 1F1B and 1F2B trials across conditions, in seconds. (C,D) Signal detection measures 
of sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) in the ability to discriminate between one and two flashes 
during 1F2B and 2F2B trials. Error bars show within-subjects adjusted 95% confidence 
intervals (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). 
 
Number	of	flashes	perceived	
Fig. 2A shows the overall mean of each participant’s mean responses in trials where a 
single flash was presented. Trials with two beeps display a strong increase in the average 
number of flashes reported. Table 1 shows the mean number of flashes reported and reaction 
times for all conditions. To test the effect of the social manipulations, we subjected the 
number of flashes perceived in 1-flash trials to a permutation-based repeated measures 
ANOVA (Kherad-Pajouh & Renaud, 2015) with beeps (1, 2 beeps) and social condition 
(individual, joint attention, control) as within-subject factors. We found a significant main 
effect of beeps, F(1, 48) = 521.78, p < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .8. When one flash was presented, the 
number of beeps affected the number of flashes reported, showing that this audiovisual 




manipulation successfully induced a fission illusion. However, we did not find a significant 
main effect of social condition (F(2, 96) = 2.41, p = .09, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .004), nor an interaction effect 
(F(2, 96) = 0.16, p = .84, 𝜂𝑔
2  < .001). 
Although the interaction was not significant, we performed the preregistered planned 
permutation-based paired t-test on the effect of beeps on the number of flashes reported (the 
difference in responses across one and two beeps trials) between the individual and joint 
attention conditions. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found no significant difference, t(48) = -
0.45, corrected p = 1, Cohen’s d = 0.06. As these results suggest that engaging in joint 
attention does not affect susceptibility to the fission illusion, we also computed Bayes factors 
(BF) for this effect to assess relative likelihoods of the null (H0) and alternative (H1) 
hypotheses (we note that Bayes factor analyses were not included in our preregistration). BF 
= 1 indicates equal support for H1 and H0, while BFs between 1-3, 3-10 and > 10 indicate 
anecdotal, moderate and strong support for H1 respectively, and BFs between .33–1, .1–.33 
and < .1 indicate anecdotal, moderate and strong support for H0, respectively (Aczel, Palfi, & 
Szaszi, 2017). We found a Bayes factor of .17, indicating that our data gives moderate 
support for the null hypothesis (it is 5.88 more likely under the null than under the alternative 
hypothesis). 
As expected, we found no significant differences in the pairwise comparisons between 
individual and control conditions on the difference in responses across one and two beeps 
trials, t(48) = -0.20, corrected p = 1, Cohen’s d = 0.03. A computed Bayes factor of .16 
indicates moderate support for the null hypothesis, so that our data are 6.3 times more likely 
under the null than under the alternative hypothesis. These results suggest that participants 
were susceptible to the fission illusion, but this susceptibility did not differ between social 
conditions. 
 





Mean Number of Flashes Reported and Mean Response Times (RTs) for Each Stimulus Type 
Across Social Conditions. 




RTs (sec.)   
Flashes 
reported  
RTs (sec.)   
Flashes 
reported  
RTs (sec.)  





 1.07 (0.25)  
0.56 
(0.29)  
 1.09 (0.29)  0.5 (0.2)  





 1.81 (0.39)  
0.62 
(0.38)  
 1.83 (0.38)  0.52 (0.22)  
2F1B   
1.38 
(0.48)  
0.65 (0.4)   1.39 (0.49)  0.65 (0.4)   1.41 (0.49)  0.54 (0.21)  





 1.95 (0.21)  
0.55 
(0.33)  
 1.95 (0.21)  0.49 (0.2)  
 
Note. Standard deviations are included in parentheses. 
 
Reaction	times	
Fig. 2B shows the overall mean of each participant’s mean reaction times in trials 
where a single flash was presented. To test whether the observed difference in latencies 
across social conditions was significant, we subjected the reaction times to a permutation-
based repeated measures ANOVA with beeps (1, 2 beeps) and social condition (individual, 
joint attention, control) as within-subject factors. We found a significant main effect of beeps 




(F(1, 48) = 9.69, p < .01, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .03), and a significant effect of social condition (F(2, 96) = 
10.45, p < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .04). The interaction effect was small though significant with F(2, 96) = 
7.78, p < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .009. We followed this interaction effect with three permutation-based 
pairwise comparisons, comparing the difference between congruent (1 flash, 1 beep) and 
incongruent (1 flash, 2 beeps) presentations between social conditions. We found that this 
congruent-incongruent difference was significantly reduced in the joint attention condition 
compared to the individual condition (t(48) = -3.43, corrected p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.48), 
and did not significantly differ between individual and control conditions, (t(48) = -2.27, 
corrected p = .078, Cohen’s d = 0.32), nor between control and joint attention conditions, 
(t(48) = -2.01, corrected p = .19, Cohen’s d = 0.28). Our results indicate that, for comparable 
performance, the response speed difference between congruent and incongruent trials 
observed during individual condition disappeared in the joint attention condition. 
Signal	detection	measures	
Signal detection theory analysis indicated that sensitivity and criterion bias did not 
visibly differ across social conditions (Fig. 2, panels C and D, respectively). One-way 
repeated ANOVAs showed neither a significant effect of social condition on sensitivity d’ 
(F(2,96) = 0.03, p = .96) nor on criterion c (F(2,96) = 0.03, p = .96). Similarly, our pre-











Pairwise Compassions of Signal Detection Measures Across Social Conditions for the 
Fission Illusion 
Measure Comparison t df 95% CI Cohen’s d Corrected p 
Sensitivity d’ Individual vs joint 
attention 
0.22 48 [-0.17, 0.21] 0.03 1 
 Individual vs 
control 
0.01 48 [-0.16, 0.16] 0.00 1 
Criterion c Individual vs joint 
attention 
0.11 48 [-0.15, 0.17] 0.02 1 
 Individual vs 
control 
-0.13 48 [-0.17, 0.15] 0.02 1 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval; Bonferroni corrected p values. 
 
3.2. Fusion illusion 
Figure 3. Fusion illusion results. (A) Mean number of flashes reported and (B) mean reaction 




times in 2F1B and 2F2B trials across conditions. (C,D) Signal detection measures of 
sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) in the ability to discriminate between one and two flashes during 
1F2B and 2F2B trials. Error bars show within-subjects adjusted 95% confidence intervals 
(Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). 
 
Number	of	flashes	perceived	
We performed the same analyses to assess the effect on the fusion illusion, where two 
flashes were presented, as we did for the fission illusion. Fig. 3A shows the overall mean of 
each participant’s mean responses in two-flashes trials. Trials with one beep showed a 
decrease in the average number of flashes reported, so that when two flashes and one beep 
were presented concurrently, participants tended toward reporting one flash. Table 1 shows 
the mean number of flashes reported and reaction times for all conditions. We subjected the 
number of flashes reported in two-flashes trials to a permutation-based repeated measures 
ANOVA with beeps (1, 2 beeps) and social condition (individual, joint attention, control) as 
within-subject factors. We found a significant main effect of beeps on the mean flashes 
reported, F(1, 48) = 144.59, p < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .55, showing that participants were susceptible to 
the fusion illusion. However, we did not find a significant main effect of social condition 
(F(2, 96) = 0.26, p = .78, 𝜂𝑔
2  < .001) or interaction effect (F(2, 96) = 0.9, p = .4, 𝜂𝑔
2  < .001). 
Although the interaction effect was not significant, we performed two planned 
comparisons as pre-registered. To test the hypothesis that the illusion diminishes during joint 
attention as compared to individual performance, we computed the difference in responses 
across one and two beeps trials, and then performed a permutation-based paired t-test 
between the individual and joint attention conditions. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found 
no significant differences, t(48) = 1.49, corrected p = .22, Cohen’s d = 0.21. These results 
suggest that engaging in joint attention does not affect susceptibility to the fusion illusion. To 




assess the relative likelihoods of the null and alternative hypotheses, we computed Bayes 
factors for this comparison and found that with a Bayes factor of .43, our data provides 
anecdotal support in favour of the null hypothesis, so that the data is 2.27 more likely under 
the null than the alternative hypothesis. As expected, we found no significant differences in 
the pairwise comparisons between individual and control conditions on the difference in 
responses across one and two beeps trials, t(48) = -0.83, corrected p = .85, Cohen’s d = 0.12. 
A computed Bayes factor of .21 indicates moderate support for the null hypothesis, so that 
our data are 4.64 times more likely under the null than the alternative hypothesis. 
These results suggest that participants were susceptible to the fusion illusion, yet this 
susceptibility did not differ between social conditions. Unlike the results for the fission 
illusion, however, our data provides only anecdotal support for the null hypothesis that there 
are no differences between individual and joint attention conditions. 
Reaction	times	
Fig. 3B shows the overall mean of each participant’s mean reaction times in trials 
where two flashes were presented. We subjected the reaction times to a permutation-based 
repeated measures ANOVA with beeps (1, 2 beeps) and social condition (individual, joint 
attention, control) as within-subject factors. We found a significant main effect of beeps (F(1, 
48) = 32.64, p < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .03), and a significant effect of social condition (F(2, 96) = 11.62, 
p < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  = .05); yet the interaction effect was not significant (F(2, 96) = 2.23, p = .11, 𝜂𝑔
2  
= .002). Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed significantly lower response times in the joint 
attention condition compared to both individual (p < .001) and control (p < .001) conditions, 
but no significant difference between the individual and the control conditions (p = .99). 
Mirroring our performance analyses, we then performed two pre-planned pairwise 
comparisons with permutation-based t-tests on the computed difference in reaction times 
between one and two beeps for each social condition. We found no significant differences 




between individual and joint attention conditions (t(48) = -1.31, corrected p = .36, Cohen’s d 
= 0.18), and neither between individual and control conditions, (t(48) = 0.75, corrected p = 
.95, Cohen’s d = 0.11). 
These results indicate that participants were faster during congruent (2 flashes, 2 beeps) 
than incongruent (2 flashes, 1 beep) stimuli, and faster in the joint attention condition 
compared to the individual or control condition, for comparable performance on the flash-
counting task. 
Signal	detection	measures	
Signal detection theory analysis indicated that sensitivity and criterion bias did not 
visibly differ across social conditions (Fig. 3, panels C and D, respectively). One-way 
repeated ANOVAs showed no significant effect of social condition on sensitivity d’ (F(2,96) 
= 0.53, p = .58), and neither on criterion c (F(2,96) = 2.75, p = .07). As in our performance 
analyses, we performed two pre-planned pairwise comparisons for differences in d’ and c, 
between individual and joint attention condition, and between individual and control 
conditions (Table 3). As shown in this table, we found a significant difference in the decision 
criterion c between joint attention (M = -0.92, SD = 0.85) and individual (M = -1.09, SD = 
0.77) conditions, suggesting that participants were less biased toward the auditory distractor 
during joint attention, as compared to performing the task individually. This reduced bias was 












Pairwise Comparisons of Signal Detection Measures Across Social Conditions for the Fusion 
Illusion 
Measure Comparison t df 95% CI Cohen’s d Corrected p 
Sensitivity d’ Individual vs joint 
attention 
1.02 48 [-0.11, 0.35] 0.15 0.63 
 Individual vs control 0.34 48 [-0.18, 0.25] 0.05 1.00 
Criterion c Individual vs joint 
attention 
-2.34 48 [-0.31, -0.02] 0.33 0.04 
 Individual vs control -0.58 48 [-0.19, 0.1] 0.08 1.00 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval; Bonferroni corrected p values. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this study, we investigated whether the hypothesis that joint attention can boost 
relative processing of sensory stimuli compared to solo attention (Becchio et al., 2008; 
Mundy, 2016, 2018; Shteynberg, 2015, 2018) extends to temporal multisensory processing. 
Specifically, we tested whether engaging in joint attention could reduce temporal audiovisual 
illusions by enhancing the processing of the jointly attended modality and/or reducing the 
distraction to the non-attended modality.  
While previous work examined the impact of joint attention on stimuli in the tactile or 
auditory modality with gaze cues displayed on a computer screen (De Jong & Dijkerman, 
2019; Nuku & Bekkering, 2010; Soto-Faraco et al., 2005), we investigated the impact of joint 




attention on audiovisual stimuli and manipulated joint attention by having two participants 
concurrently know that they are attending to the same target. Using the sound-induced flash 
illusions, participants counted visual flashes in three social conditions: alone, in pairs sitting 
in proximity, and with another participant sitting in proximity but with their attention 
engaged in a different task. In all social conditions, participants could not ignore the jointly 
presented sounds and were susceptible to both seeing more (i.e., the fission illusion) or fewer 
flashes (i.e., the fusion illusion) than actually presented. With these findings, we replicate 
previous studies that focused on individual performance (Andersen et al., 2004; Keil, 2020; 
Shams et al., 2002). Following the hypothesis that joint attention enhances information 
encoding and processing of the co-attended stimuli relative to distractors, we predicted that 
when participants jointly attend and respond to the same visual target stimuli, the sound-
induced flash illusions will be reduced. However, people did not perform better nor worse 
across the different social conditions, in both fission and fusion illusions. These findings 
suggest that the temporal integration, as measured by the number of flashes reported when 
presented with incongruent beeps, is robust across all social conditions tested. 
Regarding reaction times, people performed faster on the joint attention condition 
compared to the other social conditions across all stimuli combinations. We suggest that the 
effect on response times may be due to a social impact on motivation or arousal — a social 
facilitation effect (Belletier, Normand, & Huguet, 2019). These faster responses, however, 
did also not result in more incorrect responses. That is, as reported above, the accuracy of 
reported flashes did not differ. 
Using signal detection measures, we found that people’s criterion bias was less affected 
by the auditory beeps for the fusion illusion (i.e., their bias decreased) when engaged in joint 
attention as contrasted with the individual condition. Such an effect was not observed when 
comparing the individual and the co-presence control conditions. Interestingly, we only 




observed a bias reduction on the fusion illusion while this was not the case for the fission 
illusion, suggesting that a joint attention manipulation only affects the bias for the fusion 
illusion but not for the fission illusion. In line with earlier work (Mishra et al., 2008; Watkins 
at el., 2007; see Hirst et al., 2020, for a review), these findings suggest that the fusion and 
fission illusions may be mediated by different mechanisms and are thus susceptible to 
different experimental manipulations. 
Recent studies (Tremblay & Nguyen, 2010; Welsh, Reid, Manson, Constable, & 
Tremblay, 2020) that examined how performing or observing someone’s actions affects the 
fusion illusion may help explain our present fusion illusion effects. In particular, Tremblay & 
Nguyen (2010) found that the fusion illusion is reduced when participants start a goal-
directed reaching movement 50 to 100 ms before the audiovisual stimuli are shown. One 
likely explanation is that during the earlier stages of a goal-directed movement there is a shift 
in the relative weighting of sensory information towards vision (Kennedy, Bhattacharjee, 
Hansen, Reid, & Tremblay, 2015; Manson et al., 2018). In addition, Welsh et al. (2020) 
report that the fusion illusion is similarly attenuated when participants observe someone else 
perform the movement, suggesting that participants simulate the performance of the observed 
action, and thus experience a similar impact on multisensory processing during both action 
observation and execution. While in our study participants did not engage in any visible 
motor actions while performing the flash-counting task, one possible interpretation for the 
reduced bias during the fusion illusion is that the presence of a co-actor engaging in the same 
task and directing their attention to the same visual target could already at least minimally 
engage the same mechanisms behind the reduction of the fusion illusion during action 
execution. 
One further proviso is needed to interpret this shift in bias. Witt and colleagues (Witt et 
al. 2015, 2016) show that a change in c does not necessarily reflect a change in non-




perceptual response bias or decision bias, and that the strength of the sound-induced flash 
illusions should be reflected primarily in the criterion measure. Theoretically, the number of 
beeps bias perception to detect the same number of flashes (Witt et al. 2015). Knotts & 
Shams (2016) suggest that both d’ and c may indicate perceptual processes associated with 
the illusions. Although we cannot straightforwardly determine whether the bias is either 
purely perceptual or response-based (Witt et al., 2015, 2016), our results indicate that 
attending to the flashes together with another participant reduces the bias introduced by the 
sound distractors in the fusion illusion, though this reduction was not enough to effect a 
significant change in the mean number of flashes reported. 
While the present study investigated the impact of joint attention on the sound-induced 
flash illusion, an earlier study found that a division of labour manipulation, where the 
participant reported on the number of flashes while a confederate simultaneously reported on 
the number of beeps, induced a stronger fission illusion compared to performing the task 
alone (Wahn et al. 2020). The authors suggest that in their social manipulation, the 
participant’s visual attention was divided between the visual flash-counting task and 
attending to the co-actor which in turn increased the influence of the auditory stimuli and thus 
the number of perceived fission illusions.  
Since participants in a pair performed different tasks in this earlier study, participants 
likely showed a tendency to represent and monitor the other’s performance. For our joint 
attention manipulation, in contrast, it may not be necessary to co-represent the other person’s 
task, nor monitor their performance, since the other person attended to the same target and 
had the same task. Given these differences, the participants’ visual attention was likely not 
divided in the present study. This interpretation is in line with evidence showing that 
performing a task together reduces interference in unisensory Stroop-like tasks only when 
labour is divided, but not when it is shared (Sellaro, Treccani, & Cubelli, 2018). In their 




study, participants had to identify pictures while ignoring distractor words shown 
concurrently, which induce a semantic interference effect. The disappearance of the 
interference was observed in the joint task in which participants believed that the co-actor 
was reading the distractor words (different target), but not in the joint task in which the co-
actor was thought to name the colour of the pictures (same target) (Sellaro et al., 2018). 
Taken together with these studies, the results of the present study indicate that when the 
participant knows that another actor is taking care of potentially distracting stimuli, a division 
of labour can be established which affects the participant’s performance. But this effect 
disappears when both participants are attending and responding to the same target stimulus. 
In short, multisensory integration of temporal stimuli is affected by a division of labour 
manipulation but not by a joint attention manipulation. 
In the present study, we operationalize joint attention as the situation in which two 
individuals focus their perceptual attention on the same modal target, and both know together 
that they are so sharing their attention (Siposova & Carpenter, 2019; Tomasello, 1995). This 
minimal manipulation is sufficient to induce interferences in the case of joint action 
(Schmitz, Vesper, Sebanz & Knoblich, 2017). Outside the laboratory, however, joint 
attention comes in varying degrees, depending on how much co-attenders share between 
them (Siposova & Carpenter, 2019). Future studies could explore whether factors that elicit a 
stronger feeling of jointness affect multisensory processing. For instance, the feeling of 
jointness could be enhanced by reciprocal communicative interaction between co-attenders, 
sharing emotions (e.g., smiling), sharing object-directed action (e.g., joint intentional goals), 
familiarity or previous relationship between the individuals (e.g. family members, friends, 
partners). The sense of jointness between participants could also depend on the pay-off 
structure of the task and the required coordination between them. For example, in the absence 
of a shared goal, an individual can assign little value in co-representing the other’s 




performance, even though they are engaging in joint attention. In a case where both co-
attenders share the same goal, so that they receive greater rewards when their individual 
performances are aligned, an individual may thus benefit from co-representing the other’s 
performance and, in turn, their own perceptual processing of the jointly attended target could 
be thus greatly affected. Future studies could test this proposal, and address the role of 
different pay-off structures on an individual's multisensory processing during joint attentional 
tasks. 
Finally, our results shore up the limitations of the view that joint attention enhances 
stimulus information encoding and processing (Becchio et al., 2008; Mundy, 2018; 
Shteynberg, 2015). While this view explains the effect of joint attention in facilitating mental 
spatial rotation performance (Böckler et al., 2011), working memory (Gregory & Jackson, 
2017; Kim & Mundy, 2012), and enhancing spatial crossmodal attention (De Jong & 
Dijkerman, 2019; Nuku & Bekkering, 2010), it cannot be straightforwardly applied to the 
integration of temporal multisensory events. This study provides grounds for future work in 
comparing the effects of joint attention across temporal and spatial multisensory processes, 
and map the limitations of the view that joint attention results in greater processing resources 
to those features of the environment that are co-attended simultaneously.  
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“Joint attention might indeed be where the life of the mind and the so-
cial life first meet; and somewhere close to that meeting place is where to
find what makes us humans unique among the animals. This should be
enough to keep thinking about joint attention.” Sebastian Watzl (2012)
In this thesis, I aimed to elucidate the role of perceptual experience in charac-
terising joint attention, to examine how different senses shape joint attention
and, conversely, how joint attention can affect perception across modalities.
First, I critically assessed the view that joint attention is based on some prim-
itive intersubjective conscious relation, which cannot be explained in terms
of individual mental states of each individual. I advanced several arguments
against this view and concluded that the theory is not conceptually sound (Pa-
per I). In the second article, I proposed that current philosophical accounts
of joint attention often confound normative and psychological explanatory
aims. I then proposed an empirically informed account of the openness in
joint attention, suggesting that the mutual awareness the co-attenders enjoy
is not something they must arrive at, but that it is often implicitly assumed
(Paper II). The third article proposed that joint attention is fundamentally a
multisensory phenomenon. It showed in detail how non-visual senses make
essential contributions to joint attention (Paper III). Building on this proposal,
the fourth paper investigated whether joint attention can affect multisensory
perception. This study showed that joint attention does not affect an indi-
vidual’s integration of temporal audiovisual stimuli (Paper IV).
In the following sections, I will situate the thesis’s research contributions in
relation to other areas of philosophy and social cognitive neuroscience, and
discuss potential philosophical and scientific implications for multisensory
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research and the study of common knowledge in cognitive science. Finally,
I will highlight the limitations of the work presented in this thesis.
1 Relationalist theories of joint attention
The relational approach to joint attention is a prominent account of the phe-
nomenon. Its putative advantages over alternative views have made it an at-
tractive approach among philosophers and scientists working on joint atten-
tion, social cognition, and communication. As part of this thesis, I have shown
that the relationalist’s advantages do not hold to scrutiny (Paper I). First, it
requires a conceptual understanding of the notion of co-attendance that can
lead to a recursion of mental states — the very problem that traditional reduct-
ive accounts face. Second, to sustain the unique intersubjective character of
perceptual experience that relationalists posit, the theory requires a causal no-
tion of attention monitoring which is either too strict to be realistic or so loose
that it cannot be a purely causal notion in the first place. Third, the relational
view cannot properly account for erroneous cases of joint attention. Since it is
based on an unorthodox disassociation between someone’s perceptual exper-
ience and their own information about that perceptual experience, it implies
that one could be in joint attention without being aware of it — a conclusion
that goes against the very feature of joint attention that the view attempts to
explain: co-attenders are mutually aware of their joint attention. These argu-
ments raise significant worries for an account for joint attention based on a
relational view of perceptual experience and, more generally, for any account
that conceives of the mutual awareness in joint attention as a primitive exper-
iential phenomenon.
The relational view of joint attention has become an attractive theoret-
ical position for several cognitive and developmental psychologists, includ-
ing Moll and Meltzoff’s (2011) work on the understanding of others’ perspect-
ives, and Hobson and Hobson’s (2011) work on the affective aspects of joint
attention. Additionally, the relational view has been invoked as a comple-
mentary to, and to some extent supportive of, an interactionist approach to
social cognition based on embodied, embedded and extended interactive pro-
cesses (Gallagher, 2010; Gallagher, 2011; León et al., 2019; see also De Jaegher
et al., 2010). Similar non-reductive accounts have been proposed for com-
mon knowledge (Wilby, 2010) and collective intentionality (Gold & Harbour,
2012; cf. Bacharach, 2006). The conclusion that the relational approach can-
not provide a satisfactory theoretical account of joint attention may thus en-
courage researchers across cognitive and developmental psychology as well
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as different areas of philosophy of mind, to consider alternative approaches
to joint attention and related intersubjective phenomena.
2 From joint attention to common knowledge
Joint attention is often defined as a mutually “open” relation between co-
attenders: they are mutually aware of being so engaged. But how should this
openness be characterised? In this thesis, I argued that tensions in current
approaches to this question arise from the attempt to address simultaneously
two distinct explanatory aims: the normative aim of explaining the role of
joint attention in justifying joint endeavours and shared knowledge of the
world, and the cognitive aim of explicating the psychological capacities
and wherewithal involved in joint attention (Paper II). Current theoretical
accounts of joint attention are primarily designed to tackle the normative
concerns, and their problems arise when they conflate these concerns with
psychological ones. Drawing from evidence in developmental and cognitive
psychology, I outlined the case for a cognitive account of joint attention
based on a weaker notion of openness and mutual awareness. The arguments
advanced in this thesis have a direct implication to debates about common
knowledge and the related notion common ground in cognitive science and
the philosophy of communication.
Michael Tomasello has previously remarked that child language acquis-
ition is not a logical problem, but an empirical one. He urged that a the-
ory of human linguistic competence should be based less be on analogies to
formal languages, and more on empirical research in the cognitive sciences
(Tomasello, 2003, 328). Tomasello’s plea to distinguish logical matters from
empirical ones seems both easy to understand and, alas, easy to miss. The
clash between normative logical theories of human behaviours and theories
of the biological, psychological and social basis of behaviour in real, actual
humans is a recurrent theme in the history of cognitive science and its sibling
fields of cognitive neuroscience and neuroeconomics. One salient example
is the long-standing distinction between Econs and Humans in behavioural
economics where, traditionally, mainstream economists study the former and
cognitive scientists the latter. Econs are the agents of classical economics, fully
rational and consistent in their preferences. Humans are the real thing (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).
We see a similar tension in the philosophy and logic of knowledge. Epi-
stemic and doxastic logics traditionally make assumptions about the rational
powers of agents that are patently incompatible with the reasoning abilities of
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actual humans. For example, epistemic logics usually assume that knowledge
is closed under implication, which results in the psychologically implausible
feature that if 𝜑 is known, then all its logical consequences are immediately
known (Hintikka, 2005). This is not surprising, given that these logics are
meant to model rational epistemic states. They account for the actions and
epistemic states of Logons — the logical equivalent to the idealised Econs of
behavioural economics. They are not, for the most part, intended to model
nor explain human behaviours and the processes behind them (Solaki et al.,
2019). In fact, the question of whether humans are to be bound by the norms
of deductive epistemic logic is still debatable (Harman, 2002).
There is one object of inquiry in cognitive science on which most research-
ers, including Tomasello, have not been able to abandon the logical grip: the
phenomenon of common knowledge. Drawing from the philosophical and lo-
gical literature, many researchers have been driven to the notion that common
knowledge must involve something like recursive mindreading — the ability
to infer someone else’s thoughts about one’s own thoughts. The conflation of
logical and cognitive aims has given rise to the so-called “problem of com-
mon knowledge”: how can one account common knowledge without being
committed to an infinite regression of mental states? (Wilby, 2010, 86). Thus,
Zawidzki (2013) pleads that
we desperately need a psychologically realistic characterization of
mutual/common knowledge, since its importance in human co-
ordination is phenomenologically and empirically obvious. How-
ever, standard analyses, in terms of infinite iterations of knowledge
attributions (Schiffer, 1972), fail to explain how mutual/common
knowledge can play such an important role, due to their psycholo-
gical implausibility. (Zawidzki, 2013, 124-5)
Tomasello similarly recognises that the problem is still outstanding:
No one is certain how best to characterize this potentially infinite
loop of me monitoring the other, who is monitoring my monitor-
ing of her, and so forth (called recursive mindreading by Tomasello,
2008), but it seems to be part of infants’ experience—in some nas-
cent form—from before the first birthday. (Tomasello, 2011, 34-35;
cf. Tomasello, 2019, 44)
By and large, debates in the psychology of common knowledge and joint at-
tention have been unable to leave aside the assumption inherent in the pion-
eering work of Lewis (1969) and Schiffer (1972): the assumption of an ideal-
ised notion of rationality based on deductive logic. I have argued that this
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assumption is best put aside in analyses of joint attention (Paper II). Since the
openness or jointness of joint attention is arguably conceptually similar to the
openness of common knowledge (Campbell, 2018; cf. Stalnaker, 2002; Grice,
1957), the same may be argued in respect to later. Following from the argu-
ments presented in this thesis, we should then endeavour to be clear of what
we talk about when we talk about common knowledge in cognitive science
and philosophy of mind. Are we concerned with the normative aspects of
common knowledge, or with the neural and psychological processes behind
common knowledge? To maintain clarity, therefore, we should differentiate
between common knowledge as a normative phenomenon and the represent-
ation of common knowledge in a person’s psychology, which is a psychological
phenomenon. This later is best analysed on the level of the psychological and
neural processing of the individual. This approach, it should be noted, does
not require that we accept beforehand the logical theory of common know-
ledge as a recursion of propositional states.
Given its importance in human coordination, a psychologically realistic
characterisation of common knowledge is a key desideratum across the fields
of philosophy of action, philosophy of communication, and the social sci-
ences (Zawidzki, 2013). There is, however, little agreement on how to relate the
normative aspects of common ground with the psychological states of each in-
dividual. The approach I propose in this thesis provides a conceptual starting
point to address this issue.
3 Multisensory joint attention
In Paper III of this thesis, I propose that joint attention is fundamentally a
multisensory phenomenon, and show in detail how the combination of mul-
tiple senses not only facilitates visual coordination, but is even necessary to
certain uses of joint attention. This paper suggests that a multisensory frame-
work to joint attention is necessary to examine and study cases when (1) non-
visual senses facilitate visual joint attention, (2) people need to coordinate
their attention on non-visible properties and events, and (3) to differentiate
between joint attending to the sensible properties of a multisensory object
and the object as a whole.
This approach brings together social cognition and multisensory research,
and has several implications across different fields. The implications for ped-
agogy, clinical diagnostics, and social robotics have been already treated in the
publication. Here, I will note two further important consequences of this work
for philosophical debates and cognitive neuroscience.
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3.1 Building a shared reality
Joint attention has been considered an essential step for the development of
the concept of a shared objective reality, where mind-independent objects
are attended in common (Davidson, 1999; Brinck, 2005; Tomasello, 2014;
Seemann, 2019; Higgins et al., 2021). The ability to coordinate my attention
to an object together with another individual, goes hand in hand with the
ability to experience the object as a mind-independent thing separate from
myself (Eilan, 2005; Campbell, 2011). On the assumption that joint attention
helps us build a shared objective world, if we restrict ourselves to social gaze
interactions and vision alone this world would be incredibly impoverished.
Moreover, the triadic relation characteristic of joint attention assists in the
combination of different properties as belonging to a unitary object, and at
the same allows us to differentiate these properties from each other. This can-
not occur in a visual-only scenario. Considering the unique contributions of
different sensory modalities may thus be necessary for a theoretical account
of how a shared objective world can be constructed.
A multisensory view of joint attention has related implications for philo-
sophical debates on ostensive reference. Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) chal-
lenged his readers to point first at a piece of paper, then at its shape, now at
its colour, and at its number (which certainly sounds odd). He noted that,
although the pointer will have “meant” something different each time they
pointed, it cannot be clear from the behavioural aspects of each pointing ges-
ture what is being pointed at — whether the shape, the colour, the fact that
it is one piece and not two or three, or just the whole piece of paper. Ostens-
ive gestures are said to be, by themselves, highly ambiguous. Philosophers
since Wittgenstein have attempted to provide the necessary normative con-
ditions that the contextual circumstances of an ostensive signal must satisfy,
so that they can fix its intended reference. This is particularly pressing when
the shared knowledge between interacting individuals is limited, as can be the
case in pre-linguistic infants and animals. By and large, this philosophical en-
deavour has centred on visual gestures and language. Moreover, the ambiguity
of ostensive gestures has been usually diagnosed on the basis of isolated and
idealised unimodal (usually visual) gestures, such as pointing, and stripped
of the emotive and bodily complexities in which such gestures are embedded
in reality (Engelland, 2014). The starting point, in other words, is an impov-
erished version of interactions involving ostensive references, including joint
attention. Taking into account the role of multisensory cues and the social
strategies they support can help to dispel this impoverished view, and provides
resources to address the normative question of how the referent object of an
ostensive gesture during joint attention can be negotiated.
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3.2 Social neuroscience and multisensory research
The neuroscience of joint attention is a relatively new field. Published in
2005, in the first neuroimaging study to directly investigate joint attention,
participants were presented with video clip recordings of a face looking in a
direction either congruent or incongruent with the participant’s attentional
focus (Williams et al., 2005). Experimental paradigms using virtual computer
characters, photographs, and pre-recorded clips presented on a screen have
been a powerful tool for the study of joint attention and its cognitive effects
(Frischen et al., 2007). In particular, these paradigms can elucidate how
another person’s eye gaze or face orientation affects one’s own cognitive and
perceptual processes. These paradigms, however, have their limitations.
Participants are mere observers, approaching the artificial agent or video clip
from third-person perspective. But in most social scenarios, however, we
jointly attend with real humans. In other words, joint attention comes with a
representation of how “we” attend to an object or event together, rather than
the unilateral representation of someone else’s gaze orientation (Carpenter
et al., 1998). Even when using computer avatars, it has been shown that
participants approach a task differently when they believe that an avatar
is controlled in real-time by a human agent, than when they believe it is
controlled by a computer program (Caruana et al., 2017). The recent pro-
gramme of second-person neuroscience provides an approach to investigate
the neural basis of social cognition within the context of a real-time social
interaction (Schilbach et al., 2013; Redcay & Schilbach, 2019).
Experimental studies in second-person neuroscience arguably began
with three functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies on joint
attention published a decade ago (Schilbach et al., 2010; Redcay et al., 2010;
Saito et al., 2010; see Caruana et al., 2017, for a review). In these studies, par-
ticipants inside an MRI scanner interacted with a partner by using gaze cues.
The partner was either another human presented on a screen via a live video
feed (Redcay et al., 2010; Saito et al., 2010), or an anthropomorphic computer
avatar whom participants believed was controlled by a confederate in a
separate room (Schilbach et al., 2010). Together with further neuroimaging
studies using similar paradigms (Redcay et al., 2012; Caruana et al., 2015),
this research shows that responding to joint attentional bids is associated
with activity in brain regions associated with social cognition, including the
medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior temporal sulcus. On the other
hand, initiating joint attention is associated with activity in the inferior
frontal gyrus, a region also associated with the control of planned actions
(Caruana et al., 2017). The results from neuroimaging studies with infants and
children overlap, in general, with the results from adult studies (Oberwelland
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et al., 2016; Mundy, 2018), although some studies show greater contribution
from the ventral stratium in adults (Schilbach et al., 2010; Pfeiffer et al.,
2014), a brain area functionally associated with the anticipation of rewards
and the processing of reward prediction errors (Daniel & Pollmann, 2014).
Taken together, these studies suggest that joint attention recruits perceptual
processes, action control processes, and the so-called “mentalising network”,
which is consistently implicated when reasoning about other people’s mental
states (Schurz et al., 2014; Caruana et al., 2017; Mundy, 2018; Redcay &
Schilbach, 2019).
Second-person neuroscience has been supported by the development of
hyperscanning paradigms. Hyperscanning refers to the technique of meas-
uring the neural activity of multiple brains simultaneously (Montague et al.,
2002; for reviews see Konvalinka & Roepstorff, 2012; Czeszumski et al., 2020;
Nam et al., 2020). Hyperscanning provides a suitable method to study the syn-
chronisation of brain activity during joint attention. It can directly address the
question of how a brain engaged in joint attention differs from a brain enga-
ging in the same attentional task but without a co-attender. One of the earlier
fMRI studies on joint attention by Saito and colleagues used this technique,
as pairs of participants were scanned simultaneously while engaging in real-
time through live video feedback (Saito et al., 2010). They found that activity
in the right inferior frontal gyrus was synchronised between paired subjects,
and suggested that this region may be implicated in sharing visual attentional
states with each other. These findings were replicated by a subsequent fMRI
hyperscanning study by Koike et al. (2016). This study also reported that pairs
of participants display increased eye-blink synchronisation when they have
previously engaged in a joint attention task. Hyperscanning studies on joint
attention have also reported that the frequency of social eye contact covari-
ates with activity in the right temporal parietal junction during joint atten-
tion (Dravida et al., 2020), a brain area commonly associated with mentalising
functions (Perner et al., 2006). The field of hyperscanning is young, with sev-
eral methodological and interpretative issues still debated (e.g. Wass et al.,
2020; Novembre & Iannetti, 2021). Nevertheless, this methodology has great
potential for elucidating the neural underpinnings of joint attention and other
social interactions (Nguyen et al., 2020; Misaki et al., 2021).
It should be noted, however, that most of these studies are based on visual
joint attention. For example, participants are instructed to attend together to a
target either by following the other’s gaze, by providing self-initiated gaze cues
to the other agent to establish a common gaze direction, or by following an
external visual cue (Saito et al., 2010; Koike et al., 2016; Lachat et al., 2012; Red-
cay et al., 2012). Thus, brain systems typically reported to be involved during
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joint attention overlap with systems recruited for eye gaze following and face
processing (Mundy, 2018). Moreover, there is evidence that brain structures
associated with spatial and temporal processing are also involved in social
processing (Parkinson & Wheatley, 2015). Overlap in neural processing may
help explain the perceptual effects of performing a task jointly, which suggests
that similar brain areas may be involved in social and multisensory processing
(Wahn et al., 2020). One of the implications of the proposed framework in this
thesis for studying multisensory joint attention, is that it may allow disasso-
ciating the neural systems recruited during purely visual joint attention from
cases when visual cues are combined with other modal cues, and even when
non-visual cues are involved at all.
4 Cognitive influences on the sound-induced flash
illusions
One of the outstanding questions in the field of multisensory research is how
social factors affect multisensory processes (see, e.g., Wahn et al., 2018). The
empirical study in this thesis aims to contribute to this research programme
(Paper IV). Previous evidence suggests that visual joint attention facilitates
the crossmodal localisation of tactile and auditory targets at the location cor-
responding to the other’s gaze direction (De Jong & Dijkerman, 2019; Nuku
& Bekkering, 2010). Yet, it remains unclear whether joint attention only af-
fects spatial localisation or whether it can also modulate the temporal pro-
cessing of multisensory events. In this study, we investigated whether joint
attention affects crossmodal temporal processing using the sound-induced
flash illusions, where an incongruent number of visual flashes and auditory
beeps induces a single flash to be perceived as two (fission illusion), and two
flashes as one (fusion illusion) (Shams et al., 2000; Keil, 2020; Hirst et al., 2020).
In an individual condition, each participant performed a flash counting task
alone, while in the joint attention condition, two participants sitting next to
each other were both performing the flash counting task. A control condition
was used to discard the possibility of mere social presence effects, with two
participants sitting together but one performing a different task than a flash
counting task.
Following the hypothesis that joint attention enhances the stimulus pro-
cessing of the co-attender target relative to distractors, we predicted that the
influence of the auditory distractor over visual perception would diminish,
so that the strength of both illusions will be reduced when performing the
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task jointly compared to performing it individually. In contrast to this predic-
tion, we found that joint attention did not significantly affect the frequency
of the illusions. However, sensitivity and bias analyses revealed that parti-
cipants’ criterion bias in the fusion illusion (two flashes perceived as one) de-
creased when engaging in joint attention, compared to the individual con-
dition. These results shore up the limitations of the view that joint attention
enhances stimulus information encoding and processing (Becchio et al., 2008;
Shteynberg, 2015; Mundy, 2018).
The theoretical question addressed in this study is primarily rooted in joint
attention research and functional theories of joint attention. However, the
paradigm used and the study’s results also inform multisensory research and,
specifically, add to the understanding of which and how top-down mechan-
isms can modulate the experience of the sound-induced flash illusions from a
first-person perspective.
Several studies have previously tested whether cognitive processes can in-
fluence the susceptibility to the illusions by focusing broadly on three types of
cognitive influence:
(a) The effect of modality-specific attention: attending to sounds versus at-
tending to flashes (Andersen et al., 2004; Mishra et al., 2010; Odegaard
et al., 2016);
(b) the effect of cognitive load, brought about by having the participant con-
currently perform a different task (Michail & Keil, 2018); and
(c) the effect of prior expectations about the proportion of illusion-inducing
trials (Wang et al., 2019).
It is an open question whether these top-down cognitive modulations of the
sound-induced flash illusions are mediated by the same neural mechanisms,
although the difference in task demands may suggest that these could be dif-
ferent mechanisms. As reported in this thesis (Paper IV), we found that joint
attention does not result in a lower frequency of illusions. Although the rate
of the illusions was not affected, our results also indicate that attending to
the flashes together with another participant reduces the bias introduced by
the sound distractors in the fusion illusion. Given the different task-demands
between social and non-social flash-counting tasks, these results support the
suggestion that the mechanisms behind the reduced bias are, to some extent,
different than the mechanisms behind the three previously studied top-down
cognitive modulations of the illusions: (a) modality-specific attention, (b) cog-
nitive load, and (c) expectations about trial proportions. These results en-
courage further work to identify different mechanisms behind the attentional
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modulations of the sound-induced flash illusions, and thus contribute to our
understanding of how these illusions are processed in the brain. Together with
evidence that a division of labour manipulation induces a higher fission illu-
sion rate (Wahn et al., 2020), and that joint attention facilitates spatial cross-
modal detection (De Jong & Dijkerman, 2019; Nuku & Bekkering, 2010), our
results provide grounds and motivation for future research assessing how dif-
ferent social factors influence multisensory processes.
5 Limitations
As an object of academic study, the phenomenon of joint attention is situated
at the crossroads between research on individual perception and attention,
and research on social cognition and interaction. The study of joint atten-
tion is thus largely multidisciplinary. Joint attention has been approached by
developmental and comparative psychologists, by cognitive neuroscientists
and, more recently, by philosophers with various agendas. This plurality of
perspectives is certainly welcome. However, it has the consequence that the
current debate on joint attention can seem seldom unified.
The research in this thesis partly reflects this plurality, and thus its corol-
lary fragmented character. The thesis is composed of four collected papers
that together address the role of perceptual experience and multiple sensory
modalities in joint attention. Given that each paper is a separate stand-alone
article, however, each has its own, more narrow, agenda. Moreover, I have ap-
proached the subject of perceptual joint attention from an interdisciplinary
perspective, using both philosophical and scientific methodologies. This frag-
mented approach has its advantages. It has allowed me to focus on selected
aspects of joint attention and make specific contributions to various debates.
Thus, Papers I and II are situated within the theoretical debate explaining the
jointness of joint attention. In contrast, Papers III and IV largely take the joint-
ness question for granted, and focus instead on the role of multiple sensory
modalities and their integration during joint attention.
Unfortunately, this fragmented approach has its limitations, as each paper
pursues a different sub-objective, using different methodologies. Therefore,
this thesis does not present a fully unified account of joint attention across all
chapters. For example, while the merits of relationalism are of importance to
psychologists, the empirical study presented in this thesis does not directly de-
pend on whether that particular theoretical view is sound or not. It is hoped,
however, that this thesis shows how research in joint attention can be sus-
tained across disciplinary boundaries, and offer contributions to several fields
of research.
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Another important limitation of this thesis concerns my positive proposal
of how to analyse the mutual awareness in joint attention (Paper II). I have
proposed that mutual awareness is neither a primitive state nor a reductive
intersubjective relation that co-attenders must arrive at, but that it is often im-
plicitly assumed. We have to (un)learn that other people may not attend to the
same things we attend, or may not share the same perceptual knowledge we
are currently enjoying. While I provide empirical work in developmental and
cognitive psychology to support this view, it is nevertheless underdeveloped.
It does not yet fully address what I termed the cognitive question: What cog-
nitive capacities and mental processes or understanding are involved in joint
attention?
We need a full account of the minimal capacities necessary to assume that
one is mutually sharing attention to the same object with others. I suggested
that a minimal requirement for joint attention is that one be able to recognise
and respond to the set cues that that other person provides by implicitly as-
suming that they engage with the object in the same way. But what are these
set of cues, precisely? Tackling this question is in large part an empirical pro-
ject, but one that will benefit from conceptual analysis. Similarly, I have sug-
gested that the assumption of mutual awareness often occurs pre-reflectively
and need not be conscious. But more needs to be said about this. How can
this assumption occur unconsciously, and still impinge on a person’s sense of
interpersonal engagement? The positive proposal advanced in this thesis is
therefore preliminary and unfinished. It is ripe, in other words, to serve as the
basis for my postdoctoral research.
Finally, one further important aspect that has been left untouched in this
thesis is the relation between the philosophy of joint attention and the philo-
sophy of attention more generally. The empirical study of joint attention is
largely based on the neuroscientific view that attention is fundamentally a
type of neuronal or computational mechanism or process. For example, ac-
cording to the dynamic spotlight or zoom lens model, selective attention in-
volves the enhancement of information processing of a limited area or stim-
ulus in the environment, while decreasing processing of other information
(Eriksen & James, 1986; Klein & Lawrence, 2012). Following this conception,
Mundy suggests that “joint attention is a socially coordinated spotlight that
results in enhanced information processing of a common point of references
for social partners in ways that solo attention does not” (Mundy, 2018).
Several philosophers, however, have recently proposed theories of the
nature of attention that go beyond its role in subpersonal processing (see
Watzl, 2011, for a review). Some of these theories conceive of attention as
fundamentally a personal level mental activity. According to these views, the
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phenomenal character of attention becomes crucial to explain its functional
role (Smithies, 2011; Watzl, 2017). While these theories have been primarily
focused on an individual’s attention, a theoretical treatment of joint attention
will certainly be enriched by making an explicit connection to the different
philosophies of attention.
6 Concluding remarks
In this doctoral thesis, I used philosophical and empirical methods to
examine the role of perceptual experience in joint attention, including in
cases involving multiple sensory modalities. The thesis’ collected papers
address this aim through two related sub-objectives. First, to clarify the
role of mutual awareness and perceptual experience in characterising joint
attention. Second, to propose a functional framework to assess multisensory
contributions to establishing and maintaining joint attention and, in turn,
how joint attention may affect multisensory perception.
Research in philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology has traditionally
been centred on the individual. We tend to think of the mind in terms of the in-
dividual thoughts and skills of a self-contained and self-sufficient person, who
gathers and processes information from the world outside her head. Yet, at the
same time, we know from everyday experience that we are deeply enmeshed
in social communities, which can, and does, influence our thoughts and cog-
nitive skills in fundamental ways. While these two approaches to the mind
are often seen as opposed to each other, the need to bridge the gap between
individual cognition and social interaction is increasingly recognised by neur-
oscientists, psychologists, and philosophers (Bahrami et al., 2010; Schilbach
et al., 2013; Wahn et al., 2018; Przyrembel et al., 2012; Redcay & Schilbach,
2019). The research collected in this thesis forms part of this larger trend.
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